HOACS：同态混淆辅助的秘密隐藏技术，用于抵御商用现货（COTS）处理器中的木马攻击
HOACS: Homomorphic Obfuscation Assisted Concealing of Secrets to Thwart Trojan Attacks in COTS Processor
AI总结：
针对COTS处理器零信任场景下硬件木马窃取秘密的问题，提出基于剩余数编码的软件级全同态防御方案，无需修改硬件或信任供应链，通过LLVM插件集成到AES中，相比同类同态方案显著降低执行开销。
摘要：
与定制集成电路（IC）相比，商用现货（COTS）组件通常更受青睐，因为它们能缩短系统开发时间、降低成本，便于采用新技术，且具备可替换性。但遗憾的是，COTS组件的集成带来了严重的安全隐患。从消费者的角度来看，COTS IC供应链中的任何实体都不可信，由此形成了“零信任”威胁模型。这些实体中的任何一个都可能在组件中植入隐藏的恶意电路或硬件木马，使现场攻击者能够窃取秘密信息（如加密密钥）或导致功能故障。现有的硬件木马防御方案不适用于这种零信任场景，因为它们要么假设设计公司或代工厂是可信的，要么要求设计文件可用于分析或修改。在本研究中，我们提出了一种面向软件的防御方案，可确保秘密资产免受硬件木马的攻击，且能无缝集成到现有的COTS微处理器中。该方案无需信任任何供应链实体，也无需对IC设计进行分析或修改。为在不可信微处理器中保护秘密资产，所提方法利用剩余数编码（RNC）的概念，将对秘密资产进行操作的软件函数转换为全同态形式。我们实现了该方案以保护高级加密标准（AES）程序中的密钥，并给出了详细的安全性分析。我们还为LLVM编译器工具链开发了一个插件，可自动将该方案集成到AES中。最后，我们将基于RNC的技术中各操作的执行时间开销与同类同态解决方案进行了对比，证明其性能有显著提升。
英文摘要：
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are often preferred over custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) to achieve reduced system development time and cost, easy adoption of new technologies, and replaceability. Unfortunately, the integration of COTS components introduces serious security concerns. None of the entities in the COTS IC supply chain are trusted from a consumer's perspective, leading to a ''zero trust'' threat model. Any of these entities could introduce hidden malicious circuits or hardware Trojans within the component, allowing an attacker in the field to extract secret information (e.g., cryptographic keys) or cause a functional failure. Existing solutions to counter hardware Trojans are inapplicable in such a zero-trust scenario as they assume either the design house or the foundry to be trusted and consider the design to be available for either analysis or modification. In this work, we have proposed a software-oriented countermeasure to ensure the confidentiality of secret assets against hardware Trojans that can be seamlessly integrated in existing COTS microprocessors. The proposed solution does not require any supply chain entity to be trusted and does not require analysis or modification of the IC design. To protect secret assets in an untrusted microprocessor, the proposed method leverages the concept of residue number coding (RNC) to transform the software functions operating on the asset to be fully homomorphic. We have implemented the proposed solution to protect the secret key within the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) program and presented a detailed security analysis. We also have developed a plugin for the LLVM compiler toolchain that automatically integrates the solution in AES. Finally, we compare the execution time overhead of the operations in the RNC-based technique with comparable homomorphic solutions and demonstrate significant improvement.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
