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arXiv 2402.09403cs.CR
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审计私有预测

Auditing Private Prediction

Karan Chadha, Matthew Jagielski, Nicolas Papernot, Christopher Choquette-Choo, Milad Nasr

AI总结:

本文提出首个用于审计私有预测的框架,通过实例化不同投毒和查询能力的对手,评估四种私有预测算法的隐私泄露,发现隐私分析可改进且投毒易感性影响泄露程度。

摘要:

差分隐私(DP)为算法的潜在隐私泄露提供了理论上限,而经验性审计则确立了实际下限。目前已有针对DP训练算法的审计技术。然而机器学习也可以在推理阶段实现私有化。我们提出了首个用于审计私有预测的框架,在该框架中我们实例化了具有不同投毒和查询能力的对手。这使我们能够研究四种私有预测算法的隐私泄露:PATE [Papernot et al., 2016]、CaPC [Choquette-Choo et al al., 2020]、Prompt PATE [Duan et al al., 2023]和Private-kNN [Zhu et al., 2020]。为进行审计,我们引入了新技术,以Renyi DP的经验评估隐私泄露。实验表明:(i)私有预测的隐私分析可以改进,ii)易于投毒的算法导致更高的更高的隐私泄露,iii.没有查询控制权限的对手比比导致具有完全查询控制制的对手。我们的实验表明,我们的实验表明, (i) 私有预测的隐私分析可以改进,(ii) 易于投毒的算法导致更高的隐私泄露,以及 (iii) 对于没有查询控制权的对手,其隐私泄露显著低于具有完全控制权的对手。

英文摘要:

Differential privacy (DP) offers a theoretical upper bound on the potential privacy leakage of analgorithm, while empirical auditing establishes a practical lower bound. Auditing techniques exist forDP training algorithms. However machine learning can also be made private at inference. We propose thefirst framework for auditing private prediction where we instantiate adversaries with varying poisoningand query capabilities. This enables us to study the privacy leakage of four private prediction algorithms:PATE [Papernot et al., 2016], CaPC [Choquette-Choo et al., 2020], PromptPATE [Duan et al., 2023],and Private-kNN [Zhu et al., 2020]. To conduct our audit, we introduce novel techniques to empiricallyevaluate privacy leakage in terms of Renyi DP. Our experiments show that (i) the privacy analysis ofprivate prediction can be improved, (ii) algorithms which are easier to poison lead to much higher privacyleakage, and (iii) the privacy leakage is significantly lower for adversaries without query control than thosewith full control.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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