评估免订货成本库存模型中物品与合作的影响
Evaluating the impact of items and cooperation in inventory models with exemptable ordering costs
AI总结:
本文从博弈论角度分析免订货成本库存模型,提出最优订货策略及基于合作博弈的成本分配规则,评估物品影响,并用案例验证。
摘要:
本文从博弈论的角度引入并分析了多个多智能体或多物品连续审查库存模型,在这些模型中,如果买方的订单价格大于或等于一定金额,则买方免于支付订货成本。对于所有模型,我们获得了最优订货策略。我们首先分析了一个包含一个企业和一个物品的简单模型。然后,我们研究了一个包含一个企业和多个物品的模型,为此我们设计了一种基于合作博弈论的程序来评估每个物品对总成本的影响。接着,我们处理了一个包含多个企业且每个企业有一个物品的模型,为此我们刻画了一种规则,以联盟稳定的方式在企业之间分配总成本。最后,我们讨论了一个包含多个企业和多个物品的模型,为此我们刻画了一种规则,以联盟稳定的方式在企业之间分配总成本,并评估每个物品对使用该分配规则时每个企业应付成本的影响。本文的所有概念和结果均通过案例研究的数据进行了说明。
英文摘要:
In this paper we introduce and analyse, from a game theoretical perspective, several multi-agent or multi-item continuous review inventory models in which the buyers are exempted from ordering costs if the price of their orders is greater than or equal to a certain amount. For all models we obtain the optimal ordering policy. We first analyse a simple model with one firm and one item. Then, we study a model with one firm and several items, for which we design a procedure based on cooperative game theory to evaluate the impact of each item on the total cost. Then, we deal with a model with several firms and one item for each firm, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way. Finally, we discuss a model with several firms and several items, for which we characterise a rule to allocate the total cost among the firms in a coalitionally stable way and to evaluate the impact of each item on the cost that would be payable to each firm when using the allocation rule. All the concepts and results of this article are illustrated using data from a case study.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。