arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2402.04417cs.LGcs.MA
收藏

去中心化区块链的鲁棒多智能体多臂老虎机

Decentralized Blockchain-based Robust Multi-agent Multi-armed Bandit

Northwestern University(西北大学)

Mengfan Xu, Diego Klabjan

AI总结:

本文研究去中心化区块链上存在恶意参与者的鲁棒多智能体多臂老虎机问题,首次结合区块链技术与新颖机制设计最优策略,通过验证者池、基于数字签名的共识、基于UCB的安全多方计算策略及激励机制,证明了算法理论遗憾值上界为$\log{T}$且达到最优。

摘要:

我们研究了一个鲁棒的多智能体多臂老虎机问题,即在存在恶意参与者的情况下,多个参与者分布在一个完全去中心化的区块链上,其中部分参与者可能是恶意的。诚实参与者之间的臂奖励是同质的,遵循时间不变的随机分布,这些分布仅在满足特定条件时才向参与者揭示,以确保协调机制足够安全。协调机制的目标是有效地确保诚实参与者获得的累积奖励最大化。为此,我们首次将区块链的先进技术以及新颖的机制引入到此类合作决策框架中,为诚实参与者设计最优策略。该框架允许各种恶意行为,并维护安全性和参与者隐私。更具体地说,我们选择了一个向所有参与者通信的验证者池,为这些验证者设计了一种基于数字签名的新共识机制,发明了一种通过安全多方计算减少参与者信息需求的基于UCB的策略,并设计了链参与者交互和激励机制以鼓励参与者参与。值得注意的是,我们首次证明了所提出算法的理论遗憾值,并声称其最优性。与现有将区块链与联邦学习等学习问题集成的工作主要通过计算实验关注最优性不同,我们证明了在特定假设下,诚实参与者的遗憾值上界为$\log{T}$。该遗憾界与多智能体多臂老虎机问题一致,无论是否存在恶意参与者或仅存在不影响整个系统的纯粹拜占庭攻击。

英文摘要:

We study a robust, i.e. in presence of malicious participants, multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem where multiple participants are distributed on a fully decentralized blockchain, with the possibility of some being malicious. The rewards of arms are homogeneous among the honest participants, following time-invariant stochastic distributions, which are revealed to the participants only when certain conditions are met to ensure that the coordination mechanism is secure enough. The coordination mechanism's objective is to efficiently ensure the cumulative rewards gained by the honest participants are maximized. To this end, we are the first to incorporate advanced techniques from blockchains, as well as novel mechanisms, into such a cooperative decision making framework to design optimal strategies for honest participants. This framework allows various malicious behaviors and the maintenance of security and participant privacy. More specifically, we select a pool of validators who communicate to all participants, design a new consensus mechanism based on digital signatures for these validators, invent a UCB-based strategy that requires less information from participants through secure multi-party computation, and design the chain-participant interaction and an incentive mechanism to encourage participants' participation. Notably, we are the first to prove the theoretical regret of the proposed algorithm and claim its optimality. Unlike existing work that integrates blockchains with learning problems such as federated learning which mainly focuses on optimality via computational experiments, we demonstrate that the regret of honest participants is upper bounded by $\log{T}$ under certain assumptions. The regret bound is consistent with the multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem, both without malicious participants and with purely Byzantine attacks which do not affect the entire system.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑