arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2402.02635cs.CR
收藏

面向空间网络风险管理的原则性风险评分

Towards Principled Risk Scores for Space Cyber Risk Management

Ekzhin Ear, Brandon Bailey, Shouhuai Xu

AI总结:

本文通过真实卫星攻击场景分析NRS的优劣,提出期望属性并给出形式化基线,以指导未来空间网络风险评分设计。

摘要:

空间是对人类至关重要的新兴领域。相应地,空间网络安全也是一个有待大量研究的新兴领域。为了帮助空间网络安全从业者更好地管理网络风险,航空航天公司在其空间攻击研究与战术分析(SPARTA)框架内提出了名义风险评分(NRS),该评分可用于量化与空间基础设施和系统相关的网络风险。尽管NRS旨在供从业者采用,但尚未通过真实世界场景进行分析,这使其有效性受到质疑。在本文中,我们通过一个针对卫星的真实世界网络攻击场景分析NRS,并描述NRS的优势、劣势和适用性。这一描述促使我们提出一组期望属性,以指导未来NRS的设计。作为这一方向的第一步,我们进一步提出一种形式化方法,作为设计具有这些期望属性的未来NRS的基线。

英文摘要:

Space is an emerging domain critical to humankind. Correspondingly, space cybersecurity is an emerging field with much research to be done. To help space cybersecurity practitioners better manage cyber risks, The Aerospace Corporation proposed Notional Risk Scores (NRS) within their Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) framework, which can be applied to quantify the cyber risks associated with space infrastructures and systems. While intended for adoption by practitioners, NRS has not been analyzed with real-world scenarios, putting its effectiveness into question. In this paper we analyze NRS via a real-world cyber attack scenario against a satellite, and characterize the strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of NRS. The characterization prompts us to propose a set of desired properties to guide the design of future NRS. As a first step along this direction, we further propose a formalism to serve as a baseline for designing future NRS with those desired properties.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑