人与机械：逻各斯、真实性与ChatGPT
The Human and the Mechanical: logos, truthfulness, and ChatGPT
AI总结：
本文从语义角度论证ChatGPT等“机械心智”因缺乏外源性现实证据和内源性主观证据，无法形成真实性判断与世界信念，只能模仿人类断言行为。
摘要：
本文探讨了究竟是否适宜讨论“机械心智”，以及ChatGPT模型是否确实可被视为该概念的实现这一问题。我们的论文为当前的争论补充了一项语义层面的论证。人类的断言行为需要形成真实性判断。用情态动词修饰断言（如“约翰肯定在家”）以及使用主观性成分（如“约翰显然在家”）表明，说话者正在调整自身的判断，并且在合作语境中，意图让听话者清楚了解自己的认知状态。真实性判断基于两个要素形成：（i）与现实相关的证据（外源性证据），以及（ii）内源性证据，例如偏好和私人信念。“机械心智”缺少这两个要素：（i）它们与现实无关联，（ii）也不具备内源性证据。因此，它们完全不具备形成关于世界的信念以及真实性判断的能力。它们只能模仿这种判断，但其输出并未建立在形成该判断的核心基础之上。
英文摘要：
The paper addresses the question of whether it is appropriate to talk about `mechanical minds' at all, and whether ChatGPT models can indeed be thought of as realizations of that. Our paper adds a semantic argument to the current debate. The act of human assertion requires the formation of a veridicality judgment. Modification of assertions with modals (John must be at home) and the use of subjective elements (John is obviously at home) indicate that the speaker is manipulating her judgments and, in a cooperative context, intends her epistemic state to be transparent to the addressee. Veridicality judgments are formed on the basis of two components: (i) evidence that relates to reality (exogenous evidence) and (ii) endogenous evidence, such as preferences and private beliefs. `Mechanical minds' lack these two components: (i) they do not relate to reality and (ii) do not have endogenous evidence. Therefore they lack the ability to form a belief about the world and a veridicality judgments altogether. They can only mimic that judgment, but the output is not ground in the very foundations for it.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
