预防性人口措施的博弈论模型
A game theoretic model of preventive demographic measures
AI总结:
针对政府与自然之间的人口政策对抗问题,本文构建二人博弈模型刻画预防性措施,并通过示例求解政府的最优策略。
摘要:
本文构建了一个针对与自然对抗博弈的预防性措施博弈论模型;该模型有两名参与者,其中一方是监管机构(政府),根据影响人口过程进程的新出现内外部条件作出立法决策,另一方是环境的内外部条件(自然)。文中给出了此类博弈的一个示例,并计算了政府的最优策略。
英文摘要:
The article constructs a game-theoretic model of preventive measures for the antagonistic game with nature, that is such a model in which two participants take part, one of which is a regulating body (government) that makes legislative decisions depending on the emerging external and internal conditions affecting the course of the demographic process, the second participant - internal and external conditions of the environment (nature). An example of such a game is given and the optimal strategy for the government is calculated.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。