去中心化金融中的非原子套利
Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance
AI总结:
本文研究以太坊上去中心化交易所的非原子套利,发现合并后五大 DEX 超四分之一交易量可能来自此类 MEV,且 11 名搜索者贡献了超 80% 的 1320 亿美元套利量,并讨论了其安全影响与缓解措施。
摘要:
以太坊生态系统中最大可提取价值(MEV)的普遍存在,已使后者被描述为一片黑暗森林。迄今为止,对 MEV 的研究在很大程度上仅限于纯链上 MEV,即三明治攻击、循环套利和清算。在这项工作中,我们揭示了以太坊区块链上去中心化交易所(DEXes)上非原子套利的普遍性。重要的是,非原子套利利用以太坊区块链上的 DEXes 与以太坊区块链之外的交易所(即中心化交易所或其他区块链上的 DEXes)之间的价格差异。因此,非原子套利是一种涉及以太坊区块链上和链下行为的 MEV 类型。在我们对非原子套利的研究中,我们发现从合并到 2023 年 10 月 31 日期间,以太坊最大的五个 DEXes 上超过四分之一的交易量可能归因于这种类型的 MEV。我们进一步强调,仅十一名搜索者就贡献了已识别的非原子套利交易量的 80% 以上,金额高达惊人的 1320 亿美元,并揭示了区块构建市场的中心化与非原子套利之间的联系。最后,我们讨论了这些高价值交易的安全影响,这些交易占以太坊总区块价值的 10% 以上,并概述了可能的缓解措施。
英文摘要:
The prevalence of maximal extractable value (MEV) in the Ethereum ecosystem has led to a characterization of the latter as a dark forest. Studies of MEV have thus far largely been restricted to purely on-chain MEV, i.e., sandwich attacks, cyclic arbitrage, and liquidations. In this work, we shed light on the prevalence of non-atomic arbitrage on decentralized exchanges (DEXes) on the Ethereum blockchain. Importantly, non-atomic arbitrage exploits price differences between DEXes on the Ethereum blockchain as well as exchanges outside the Ethereum blockchain (i.e., centralized exchanges or DEXes on other blockchains). Thus, non-atomic arbitrage is a type of MEV that involves actions on and off the Ethereum blockchain. In our study of non-atomic arbitrage, we uncover that more than a fourth of the volume on Ethereum's biggest five DEXes from the merge until 31 October 2023 can likely be attributed to this type of MEV. We further highlight that only eleven searchers are responsible for more than 80% of the identified non-atomic arbitrage volume sitting at a staggering $132 billion and draw a connection between the centralization of the block construction market and non-atomic arbitrage. Finally, we discuss the security implications of these high-value transactions that account for more than 10% of Ethereum's total block value and outline possible mitigations.
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