温室气体抵消信用市场中的纳什均衡
Nash Equilibria in Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit Markets
AI总结：
本文提出温室气体抵消信用市场框架，将单参与者建模为最优停止与控制问题、两参与者建模为混合策略纳什均衡问题，并通过数值解与Monte Carlo模拟验证最优交易和生成的收益。
摘要：
减少温室气体（GHG）排放的一种方法是激励碳捕集与碳减排项目，同时惩罚超额的GHG产出。在本研究中，我们提出了一个新颖的市场框架，并刻画了温室气体抵消信用（OC）市场参与者在单参与者和两参与者情形下的最优行为。单参与者情形被表述为最优停止与控制问题，而两参与者情形被表述为最优停止与混合策略纳什均衡问题。我们通过数值解和Monte Carlo模拟证明了采取最优行动的重要性，并探讨了同质参与者与异质参与者之间的差异。在两种情形下，我们均发现市场参与者能够从最优OC交易和OC生成中获益。
英文摘要：
One approach to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to incentivize carbon capturing and carbon reducing projects while simultaneously penalising excess GHG output. In this work, we present a novel market framework and characterise the optimal behaviour of GHG offset credit (OC) market participants in both single-player and two-player settings. The single player setting is posed as an optimal stopping and control problem, while the two-player setting is posed as optimal stopping and mixed-Nash equilibria problem. We demonstrate the importance of acting optimally using numerical solutions and Monte Carlo simulations and explore the differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous players. In both settings, we find that market participants benefit from optimal OC trading and OC generation.
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