洋葱路由与混合网络数据包格式Sphinx的可证明安全性
Provable Security for the Onion Routing and Mix Network Packet Format Sphinx
AI总结：
针对洋葱路由与混合网络所用Sphinx数据包格式原证明策略有缺陷的问题，本文构建理论框架，提出需用GDH假设替代DDH假设，证明经轻微调整的Sphinx在GDH假设下安全，是首个给出其详细深入安全证明的研究。
摘要：
洋葱路由和混合网络是为用户提供互联网匿名访问的基础概念，各类相关方案都依赖高效的Sphinx数据包格式。但近期研究发现Sphinx底层证明策略存在缺陷，目前尚不清楚Sphinx实际能提供哪些安全保障，更糟的是尚无合适的证明策略可用。本文通过构建Sphinx的理论框架，恢复了所有这类工作的安全基础。我们发现此前使用的DDH（决策迪菲-赫尔曼）假设不足以支撑安全性证明，证明需改用Gap Diffie-Hellman（GDH，间隙迪菲-赫尔曼）假设。我们应用该假设证明，经过轻微调整的Sphinx数据包格式在GDH假设下是安全的。本研究是首个以此方式为Sphinx提供详细深入安全证明的工作。我们对Sphinx的调整是必要的，我们通过针对发送方隐私的攻击证明，若不做调整该攻击将可行。
英文摘要：
Onion routing and mix networks are fundamental concepts to provide users with anonymous access to the Internet. Various corresponding solutions rely on the efficient Sphinx packet format. However, flaws in Sphinx's underlying proof strategy were found recently. It is thus currently unclear which guarantees Sphinx actually provides, and, even worse, there is no suitable proof strategy available. In this paper, we restore the security foundation for all these works by building a theoretical framework for Sphinx. We discover that the previously-used DDH assumption is insufficient for a security proof and show that the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption is required instead. We apply it to prove that a slightly adapted version of the Sphinx packet format is secure under the GDH assumption. Ours is the first work to provide a detailed, in-depth security proof for Sphinx in this manner. Our adaptations to Sphinx are necessary, as we demonstrate with an attack on sender privacy that would be possible otherwise.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
