多数并非必需:来自次多数对手的私密双花攻击的理性分析
Majority is Not Required: A Rational Analysis of the Private Double-Spend Attack from a Sub-Majority Adversary
AI总结:
本研究针对中本聪式PoW加密货币的双花攻击问题,提出由矿工限制区块交易价值以降低攻击奖励的防御思路,通过平均场博弈建模证明该策略可提升矿工收益,并指出比特币6确认机制下25%算力攻击者即可获利。
摘要:
我们研究中本聪式工作量证明加密货币中双花攻击背后的激励机制。在这类系统中,矿工可以选择在其区块中引用哪些交易,而一种常见的交易选择策略就是直接挑选手续费最高的交易。如果这些交易来自拥有可观(但低于50%)算力的对手,这一策略可能会带来问题:高价值交易可能会激励理性对手在预期可获利时尝试发起双花攻击。\n防范双花攻击的最常见机制是大额交易的接收方等待更多的区块确认(即提高攻击成本)。我们认为这种防御机制并不理想,因为系统的安全性取决于其用户的行为。相反,我们提出防御双花攻击应当是矿工的责任;具体而言,矿工应当限制其纳入单个区块的交易价值总额(即降低攻击奖励)。\n为此,我们将加密货币挖矿建模为一个平均场博弈,在其中我们对标准挖矿奖励函数进行扩展,以模拟存在一个理性的、实施双花攻击的对手的场景。我们设计并实现了一种算法,用于刻画均衡状态下的矿工行为,并且我们证明,采用感知对手的奖励函数的矿工比不采用该函数的矿工积累更多财富。我们表明,诚实矿工的最优策略是限制每个区块承载的转账价值总额,使得对手的预期利润为0。\n此外,我们还检验了Bitcoin(比特币)对双花攻击的抵御能力。假设区块确认时间为6个区块,我们发现拥有至少25%网络挖矿算力的攻击者可以预期从双花攻击中获利。
英文摘要:
We study the incentives behind double-spend attacks on Nakamoto-style Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies. In these systems, miners are allowed to choose which transactions to reference with their block, and a common strategy for selecting transactions is to simply choose those with the highest fees. This can be problematic if these transactions originate from an adversary with substantial (but less than 50\%) computational power, as high-value transactions can present an incentive for a rational adversary to attempt a double-spend attack if they expect to profit. The most common mechanism for deterring double-spend attacks is for the recipients of large transactions to wait for additional block confirmations (i.e., to increase the attack cost). We argue that this defense mechanism is not satisfactory, as the security of the system is contingent on the actions of its users. Instead, we propose that defending against double-spend attacks should be the responsibility of the miners; specifically, miners should limit the amount of transaction value they include in a block (i.e., reduce the attack reward). To this end, we model cryptocurrency mining as a mean-field game in which we augment the standard mining reward function to simulate the presence of a rational, double-spending adversary. We design and implement an algorithm which characterizes the behavior of miners at equilibrium, and we show that miners who use the adversary-aware reward function accumulate more wealth than those who do not. We show that the optimal strategy for honest miners is to limit the amount of value transferred by each block such that the adversary's expected profit is 0. Additionally, we examine Bitcoin's resilience to double-spend attacks. Assuming a 6 block confirmation time, we find that an attacker with at least 25% of the network mining power can expect to profit from a double-spend attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。