DPoS区块链中的接管有多难？理解基于代币投票治理的安全性
How Hard is Takeover in DPoS Blockchains? Understanding the Security of Coin-based Voting Governance
AI总结：
本文通过理论分析与大规模实证研究，揭示DPoS区块链的接管抵抗力受投票治理设计及投票者偏好多样性影响，并为提升基于代币投票治理的区块链安全性提出改进方向。
摘要：
委托权益证明（Delegated-Proof-of-Stake，DPoS）区块链，如EOSIO、Steem和TRON，由一个通过基于代币投票系统选举产生的区块生产者委员会进行治理。我们最近见证了发生在Steem和TRON之间的首次事实上的区块链接管事件。在此事件发生的一小时内，TRON创始人接管了整个Steem委员会，迫使原有的Steem社区离开了他们维护多年的区块链。这是区块链和Web 3.0演进中的一个历史性事件。尽管其具有显著的破坏性影响，但人们对DPoS区块链在总体上对接管有多脆弱，以及我们能够以何种方式提高其对接管的抵抗力，仍然知之甚少。\n在本文中，我们证明了DPoS区块链对接管的抵抗力同时受其底层基于代币投票治理系统的理论设计和实际使用情况所支配。当投票者积极合作以抵抗潜在接管时，我们的理论分析揭示，当前DPoS区块链的主动抵抗力远低于理论上限。然而在实践中，投票者偏好可能存在显著差异。本文首次对EOSIO、Steem和TRON的被动接管抵抗力进行了大规模实证研究。我们的研究识别了投票者偏好的多样性，并刻画了这种多样性对接管抵抗力的影响。通过理论和实证分析，我们的研究为基于代币投票治理的安全性提供了新的见解，并提出了提高任何实现该治理模型的区块链的接管抵抗力的潜在方法。
英文摘要：
Delegated-Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) blockchains, such as EOSIO, Steem and TRON, are governed by a committee of block producers elected via a coin-based voting system. We recently witnessed the first de facto blockchain takeover that happened between Steem and TRON. Within one hour of this incident, TRON founder took over the entire Steem committee, forcing the original Steem community to leave the blockchain that they maintained for years. This is a historical event in the evolution of blockchains and Web 3.0. Despite its significant disruptive impact, little is known about how vulnerable DPoS blockchains are in general to takeovers and the ways in which we can improve their resistance to takeovers. In this paper, we demonstrate that the resistance of a DPoS blockchain to takeovers is governed by both the theoretical design and the actual use of its underlying coin-based voting governance system. When voters actively cooperate to resist potential takeovers, our theoretical analysis reveals that the current active resistance of DPoS blockchains is far below the theoretical upper bound. However in practice, voter preferences could be significantly different. This paper presents the first large-scale empirical study of the passive takeover resistance of EOSIO, Steem and TRON. Our study identifies the diversity in voter preferences and characterizes the impact of this diversity on takeover resistance. Through both theoretical and empirical analyses, our study provides novel insights into the security of coin-based voting governance and suggests potential ways to improve the takeover resistance of any blockchain that implements this governance model.
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