基于事件的并发系统信息流安全组合式推理
Event-based Compositional Reasoning of Information-Flow Security for Concurrent Systems
AI总结:
本文提出一种基于依赖-保证和事件展开条件的组合式推理方法,用于形式化验证并发系统信息流安全,并在Isabelle/HOL中基于ARINC 653标准对多核分离内核进行了机械化验证。
摘要:
并发系统的高保证信息流安全(IFS)具有挑战性。并发系统形式化验证的一种有前景的方法是依赖-保证方法。然而,现有的面向IFS的组合式推理方法集中于基于语言的IFS,通常不适用于系统级安全,例如多核操作系统内核,在这些场景中动作的保密性也应被考虑。另一方面,现有关于依赖-保证方法的研究基本上建立在并发编程语言之上,通过这种方式无法以直接的方式完整刻画并发系统的语义。为了形式化验证并发系统中基于状态-动作的IFS,本文提出了一种基于依赖-保证的IFS组合式推理方法。我们首先通过将“事件”纳入并发语言来设计一种语言,并给出该语言的IFS语义。作为基本元素,事件为系统建模提供了极其简洁的框架,并且在我们语言中不一定是原子的。为了实现IFS的组合式推理,我们使用依赖-保证规范在事件上定义新形式的展开条件(UCs),即事件UCs。通过该语言的依赖-保证证明系统以及事件UCs的可靠性,我们得到事件UCs蕴含并发系统的IFS。通过这种方式,我们放宽了传统UCs中对动作的原子性约束,并提供了一种IFS的组合式推理方法,其中系统的安全证明可以通过对各个事件的独立安全证明来完成。最后,我们在Isabelle/HOL中对该方法进行了机械化,并根据工业标准ARINC 653,开发了多核分离内核的形式化规范及其IFS证明作为研究案例。
英文摘要:
High assurance of information-flow security (IFS) for concurrent systems is challenging. A promising way for formal verification of concurrent systems is the rely-guarantee method. However, existing compositional reasoning approaches for IFS concentrate on language-based IFS. It is often not applicable for system-level security, such as multicore operating system kernels, in which secrecy of actions should also be considered. On the other hand, existing studies on the rely-guarantee method are basically built on concurrent programming languages, by which semantics of concurrent systems cannot be completely captured in a straightforward way. In order to formally verify state-action based IFS for concurrent systems, we propose a rely-guarantee-based compositional reasoning approach for IFS in this paper. We first design a language by incorporating ``Event'' into concurrent languages and give the IFS semantics of the language. As a primitive element, events offer an extremely neat framework for modeling system and are not necessarily atomic in our language. For compositional reasoning of IFS, we use rely-guarantee specification to define new forms of unwinding conditions (UCs) on events, i.e., event UCs. By a rely-guarantee proof system of the language and the soundness of event UCs, we have that event UCs imply IFS of concurrent systems. In such a way, we relax the atomicity constraint of actions in traditional UCs and provide a compositional reasoning way for IFS in which security proof of systems can be discharged by independent security proof on individual events. Finally, we mechanize the approach in Isabelle/HOL and develop a formal specification and its IFS proof for multicore separation kernels as a study case according to an industrial standard -- ARINC 653.
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