Sync+Sync:一种基于fsync与存储构建的隐蔽信道
Sync+Sync: A Covert Channel Built on fsync with Storage
AI总结:
本研究发现并发fsync调用会因共享存储栈软硬件资源产生时延竞争,据此构建Sync+Sync隐蔽信道,实现跨隔离环境的高带宽低误码率传输,并可用于侧信道攻击窃取数据库操作等细粒度信息。
摘要:
科学家们已利用CPU缓存和主内存构建了多种用于秘密信息传输的隐蔽信道。在本文中,我们转向内存层次结构中更低的层级,即持久存储。大多数程序以文件形式存储中间或最终结果,其中部分程序会调用fsync将文件与存储设备同步持久化,以实现有序的持久化。我们的定量研究表明,若另一个程序同时调用fsync,即使两个程序不共享任何数据,前者的fsync调用响应时间也会显著变长。我们进一步发现,由于共享软件结构(如Ext4的日志)和硬件资源(如磁盘的I/O调度队列),并发的fsync调用会在存储栈的多个层级产生竞争。\n我们据此构建了名为Sync+Sync的隐蔽信道。在普通固态硬盘上,Sync+Sync的传输带宽可达20000比特每秒,错误率约为0.40%。Sync+Sync可在跨磁盘分区、跨文件系统、跨容器、跨虚拟机甚至跨磁盘驱动器的模式下运行,且程序之间无需共享数据。接下来,我们利用Sync+Sync发起侧信道攻击,成功精确检测到受害数据库的操作(如插入/更新和B树节点分裂)。我们还利用Sync+Sync通过检测和分析应用与网站的fsync频率及刷新数据量,高精度地区分它们。这些攻击可用于支持进一步的细粒度信息泄露。
英文摘要:
Scientists have built a variety of covert channels for secretive information transmission with CPU cache and main memory. In this paper, we turn to a lower level in the memory hierarchy, i.e., persistent storage. Most programs store intermediate or eventual results in the form of files and some of them call fsync to synchronously persist a file with storage device for orderly persistence. Our quantitative study shows that one program would undergo significantly longer response time for fsync call if the other program is concurrently calling fsync, although they do not share any data. We further find that, concurrent fsync calls contend at multiple levels of storage stack due to sharing software structures (e.g., Ext4's journal) and hardware resources (e.g., disk's I/O dispatch queue). We accordingly build a covert channel named Sync+Sync. Sync+Sync delivers a transmission bandwidth of 20,000 bits per second at an error rate of about 0.40% with an ordinary solid-state drive. Sync+Sync can be conducted in cross-disk partition, cross-file system, cross-container, cross-virtual machine, and even cross-disk drive fashions, without sharing data between programs. Next, we launch side-channel attacks with Sync+Sync and manage to precisely detect operations of a victim database (e.g., insert/update and B-Tree node split). We also leverage Sync+Sync to distinguish applications and websites with high accuracy by detecting and analyzing their fsync frequencies and flushed data volumes. These attacks are useful to support further fine-grained information leakage.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。