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arXiv 2308.02477cs.DCcs.CR
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关于 gossiping 的固有匿名性

On the Inherent Anonymity of Gossiping

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL)(洛桑联邦理工学院);University of Toronto(多伦多大学)

Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Anastasiia Kucherenko, Rafael Pinot, Sasha Voitovych

AI总结:

本文基于 ε-差分隐私分析 gossiping 的固有匿名性,证明了在连接性较差的图中 gossip 协议无法提供有效隐私保障,但通过 cobra 走向等协议可实现源匿名性保证。

摘要:

检测 gossip 的来源是一个关键问题,与在流行病中确定患者零或在社交网络中确定谣言起源有关。尽管人们普遍认为随机和局部的 gossip 通信使来源识别困难,但不存在一般量化 gossip 提供的匿名水平的方法。本文提出了一种基于 ε-差分隐私的原则性方法,用于分析 gossiping 在大规模图中的固有来源匿名性。首先,我们量化了在任意通信图中任何 gossip 协议能保证的来源匿名性的基本限制。特别地,我们的结果表明,当图的连接性较差时,没有任何 gossip 协议能保证任何有意义的差分隐私水平。这促使我们进一步分析具有受控连接性的图。我们证明在这些图上,一大类 gossip 协议,即 cobra 走向,为来源提供了实质性的差分隐私保证。为此,我们引入了一种基于将 gossip 协议减少到我们称为具有概率淘汰的随机行走的原始证明技术。这种证明技术对 gossip 社区具有独立兴趣,并可扩展到来自安全社区的其他协议,如 Dandelion 协议。有趣的是,我们的精确分析准确捕捉了 gossip 协议传播时间和其来源匿名性之间的权衡。

英文摘要:

Detecting the source of a gossip is a critical issue, related to identifying patient zero in an epidemic, or the origin of a rumor in a social network. Although it is widely acknowledged that random and local gossip communications make source identification difficult, there exists no general quantification of the level of anonymity provided to the source. This paper presents a principled method based on $\varepsilon$-differential privacy to analyze the inherent source anonymity of gossiping for a large class of graphs. First, we quantify the fundamental limit of source anonymity any gossip protocol can guarantee in an arbitrary communication graph. In particular, our result indicates that when the graph has poor connectivity, no gossip protocol can guarantee any meaningful level of differential privacy. This prompted us to further analyze graphs with controlled connectivity. We prove on these graphs that a large class of gossip protocols, namely cobra walks, offers tangible differential privacy guarantees to the source. In doing so, we introduce an original proof technique based on the reduction of a gossip protocol to what we call a random walk with probabilistic die out. This proof technique is of independent interest to the gossip community and readily extends to other protocols inherited from the security community, such as the Dandelion protocol. Interestingly, our tight analysis precisely captures the trade-off between dissemination time of a gossip protocol and its source anonymity.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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