Existing research primarily focuses on backdoor attacks and defenses within the generic federated learning scenario, where all clients collaborate to train a single global model. A recent study conducted by Qin et al. (2023) marks the initial exploration of backdoor attacks within the personalized federated learning (pFL) scenario, where each client constructs a personalized model based on its local data. Notably, the study demonstrates that pFL methods with \textit{parameter decoupling} can significantly enhance robustness against backdoor attacks. However, in this paper, we whistleblow that pFL methods with parameter decoupling are still vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The resistance of pFL methods with parameter decoupling is attributed to the heterogeneous classifiers between malicious clients and benign counterparts. We analyze two direct causes of the heterogeneous classifiers: (1) data heterogeneity inherently exists among clients and (2) poisoning by malicious clients further exacerbates the data heterogeneity. To address these issues, we propose a two-pronged attack method, BapFL, which comprises two simple yet effective strategies: (1) poisoning only the feature encoder while keeping the classifier fixed and (2) diversifying the classifier through noise introduction to simulate that of the benign clients. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets under varying conditions demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack. Additionally, we evaluate the effectiveness of six widely used defense methods and find that BapFL still poses a significant threat even in the presence of the best defense, Multi-Krum. We hope to inspire further research on attack and defense strategies in pFL scenarios. The code is available at: https://github.com/BapFL/code.
MARS: A Malignity-Aware Backdoor Defense in Federated Learning
Faculty of Data Science, City University of Macau(澳门城市大学数据科学学院);School of Computing, Australian National University(澳大利亚国立大学计算机学院);Ant Group(蚂蚁集团);School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology(华中科技大学网络安全工程学院);School of Computer Science and Technology, Huazhong University of Science and Technology(华中科技大学计算机科学与技术学院);College of Computing and Data Science, Nanyang Technological University(南洋理工大学计算与数据科学学院);School of Information and Communication Technology, Griffith University(格里菲斯大学信息与通信技术学院)
Backdoor Attack on Vertical Federated Graph Neural Network Learning
Fudan University(复旦大学);Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology(南京信息工程大学);Pennsylvania State University(宾夕法尼亚州立大学);Zhejiang University(浙江大学)
Buffer is All You Need: Defending Federated Learning against Backdoor Attacks under Non-iids via Buffering
Miner School of Computer and Information Sciences, University of Massachusetts Lowell(马萨诸塞大学洛厄尔分校迈纳计算机与信息科学学院);University of South Florida(南佛罗里达大学);University of Kentucky(肯塔基大学);Purdue University(普渡大学);North Carolina State University(北卡罗来纳州立大学)
Neurotoxin: Durable Backdoors in Federated Learning
Southeast University(东南大学);Princeton University(普林斯顿大学);University of California at Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);International Computer Science Institute(国际计算机科学研究所)
由于其分散的性质,联邦学习(FL)系统在训练过程中对对抗性后门攻击具有固有的脆弱性。在这种类型的攻击中,攻击者的目标是使用中毒更新将所谓的后门植入到学习模型中,以便在测试时,模型的输出可以固定为特定输入的给定目标。(As一个简单的玩具示例,如果用户将“people from New York”键入到使用后门下一单词预测模型的移动键盘应用中,则该模型可以将句子自动完成为“people from New York are rude”)。先前的工作已经表明,后门可以插入到FL模型中,但是这些后门通常不耐用,即,在攻击者停止上载中毒更新之后,它们不会保留在模型中。因此,由于训练通常在生产FL系统中逐步继续,因此插入的后门可能无法存活直到部署。在这里,我们提出了神经毒素,一个简单的一行修改现有的后门攻击,通过攻击参数,在训练过程中变化较小的幅度。我们对十个自然语言处理和计算机视觉任务进行了详尽的评估,我们发现我们可以将最先进的后门的耐久性提高一倍。
Beyond Traditional Threats: A Persistent Backdoor Attack on Federated Learning
College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University(哈尔滨工程大学计算机科学与技术学院);Southampton Ocean Engineering Joint Institute, Harbin Engineering University(哈尔滨工程大学南安普顿海洋工程联合学院)
HPE: Hallucinated Positive Entanglement for Backdoor Attacks in Federated Self-Supervised Learning
School of Information Engineering, Yangzhou University(扬州大学信息工程学院);Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences(中国科学院信息工程研究所);School of Computing and Artificial Intelligence, Chaohu University(巢湖学院计算与人工智能学院);College of Data Science, Jiaxing University(嘉兴大学数据科学学院);Tacoma School of Engineering and Technology, University of Washington(华盛顿大学塔科马工程技术学院)
Exploiting Layer-Specific Vulnerabilities to Backdoor Attack in Federated Learning
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran(塔里斯坦大学电气与计算机工程学院);School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran(谢尔兹大学电气与计算机工程学院);Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology, Okinawa, Japan(冲绳科学技术研究院);School of Computer Science, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran(基础科学研究院(IPM)计算机科学学院)
Structure-Aware Distributed Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning
Faculty of Applied Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University(应用科学学院,澳门理工学院);Faculty of Cyberspace Security, Software Engineering Institute of Guangzhou(网络安全学院,广州软件工程研究院);School of Engineering and Technology, Central Queensland University(工程与技术学院,中央昆士兰大学);Faculty of Software and Artificial Intelligence, Software Engineering Institute of Guangzhou(软件与人工智能学院,广州软件工程研究院)
Model Poisoning Against Federated Model Adaptation with Chain of Bit-Flips
CEA-Leti, Mines Saint-Etienne, Equipe Commune SAS(CEA-莱蒂, Mines圣艾蒂安, 共同团队SAS);Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CEA-Leti(格勒诺布尔阿尔卑斯大学, CEA-莱蒂);Mines Saint-Etienne, CEA-Leti, Centre CMP, Equipe commune SAS(Mines圣艾蒂安, CEA-莱蒂, CMP中心, 共同团队SAS)
Defending Against Backdoor Attacks via Alignment Checking in Model-Contrastive Federated Learning
Shandong Computer Science Center(山东计算机科学中心);Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences)(齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院));College of computer science and technology, China University of Petroleum(中国石油大学计算机科学与技术学院);School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院);Big Data Institute, Qilu University of Technology(齐鲁工业大学大数据研究院)
STAIN-FL: Stealthy Targeted Attack Injection with Contextual Triggers in Federated Learning
Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT)(新加坡理工学院(SIT));SingHealth Duke-NUS AI in Medicine Institute(新加坡保健服务集团杜克-新加坡国立大学医学院AI研究所);SingHealth AI Office(新加坡保健服务集团AI办公室)
Defending the Edge: Representative-Attention Defense against Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning
Dept. of Computer Science Faculty of Engineering University of Manchester Manchester, United Kingdom;Dept. of Computer Science Faculty of Engineering University of Manchester \& MBZUAI Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates;Dept. of Computer Science Faculty of Engineering University of Manchester \& KU Leuven Manchester, United Kingdom
Data and Model Poisoning Backdoor Attacks on Wireless Federated Learning, and the Defense Mechanisms: A Comprehensive Survey
Deakin University(迪肯大学);Data61, CSIRO(澳大利亚联邦科学与工业研究组织数据61研究所);Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences)(齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院));University of Manitoba(曼尼托巴大学)