具有价格依赖进入的最优泡沫驾驭:带共同噪声的控制平均场博弈
Optimal Bubble Riding with Price-dependent Entry: a Mean Field Game of Controls with Common Noise
AI总结:
本文扩展了最优泡沫驾驭模型,引入依赖价格的进入时间,将其转化为带共同噪声和随机进入时间的控制平均场博弈,通过弱形式离散化求解并证明了均衡的存在性。
摘要:
本文进一步扩展了Tangpi和Wang提出的最优泡沫驾驭模型,允许存在依赖价格的进入时间。智能体由各自的个体进入阈值刻画,该阈值代表他们对泡沫强度的信念。相反,泡沫的增长动态由玩家的涌入推动。依赖价格的进入自然引出了一个带共同噪声和随机进入时间的控制平均场博弈,我们为其提供了存在性结果。通过首先求解博弈在弱形式下的离散化版本,然后考察极限中的可测性,从而得到均衡。本文中,共同噪声来自两个来源:所有智能体交易的资产价格,以及外生泡沫破裂时间,我们同样对其进行离散化,并通过滤子的渐进扩张将其纳入模型。
英文摘要:
In this paper we further extend the optimal bubble riding model proposed by Tangpi and Wang by allowing for price-dependent entry times. Agents are characterized by their individual entry threshold that represents their belief in the strength of the bubble. Conversely, the growth dynamics of the bubble is fueled by the influx of players. Price-dependent entry naturally leads to a mean field game of controls with common noise and random entry time, for which we provide an existence result. The equilibrium is obtained by first solving discretized versions of the game in the weak formulation and then examining the measurability property in the limit. In this paper, the common noise comes from two sources: the price of the asset which all agents trade, and also the exogenous bubble burst time, which we also discretize and incorporate into the model via progressive enlargement of filtration.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。