权力交给青少年?一个父母与青少年集体劳动供给模型
Power to the teens? A model of parents' and teens' collective labor supply
AI总结:
本文针对家庭行为模型忽略青少年与父母联合决策的问题,利用哥斯达黎加数据和有条件现金转移项目,提出集体家庭模型,发现子女与父母议价存在性别差异,儿子上学机会成本更高,为相关公共政策制定提供依据。
摘要:
青少年在做改变人生的决策时,会受到其成长家庭的需求与资源的限制。家庭行为模型通常将决策权交给青少年或其父母,忽略了家庭中的联合决策。本文利用2011年至2019年哥斯达黎加全国家庭调查(Encuesta Nacional de Hogares)的数据以及一项有条件现金转移支付项目,证明青少年与父母会共同分配时间与收入。首先,本文采用边际处理效应框架,呈现了家庭对转移支付的反应存在性别差异。其次,本文解释了结果中的性别差距源于父母与青少年之间的议价过程。本文提出了一个集体家庭模型,并证明儿子会与父母进行合作议价,而女儿则不会。这一结果意味着儿子上学的机会成本高于女儿。针对青少年的公共政策必须考虑这一性别差异才能有效。
英文摘要:
Teens make life-changing decisions while constrained by the needs and resources of the households they grow up in. Household behavior models frequently delegate decision-making to the teen or their parents, ignoring joint decision-making in the household. I show that teens and parents allocate time and income jointly by using data from the Costa Rican Encuesta Nacional de Hogares from 2011 to 2019 and a conditional cash transfer program. First, I present gender differences in household responses to the transfer using a marginal treatment effect framework. Second, I explain how the gender gap from the results is due to the bargaining process between parents and teens. I propose a collective household model and show that sons bargain cooperatively with their parents while daughters do not. This result implies that sons have a higher opportunity cost of attending school than daughters. Public policy targeting teens must account for this gender disparity to be effective.
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