魅力肌肉:为什么拥有身体并不意味着具身
Glamour muscles: why having a body is not what it means to be embodied
AI总结:
本文辨析具身概念,指出拥有身体或在物理空间运动并非具身本质,真正的具身在于持续协商身体的功能、设计与完整性。
摘要:
具身近来重新受到关注,被视为增强智能机器能力的一种手段。具身的支持者似乎暗示,针对物理空间中的运动进行优化,所促进的东西超越了获得解决物理空间问题的小众能力。然而,原则上没有任何理由应如此区分物理空间中的行动选择问题与更抽象空间(如语言空间)中的行动选择问题。相反,使具身作为通向更高智能的手段具有说服力的是,它承诺捕捉但并未真正实现关于某些身体(生命智能)的偶然事实以及与之相关的活动模式。这些包括对毁灭的主动抵抗,以及对使世界可被理解的过程的可修正约束。我们认为,要在创造小众工具之外具有理论或实践用途,“具身”不能是拥有身体这一平凡事实,也不能是身体在空间中的运动,而是对该身体的功能、设计和完整性的持续协商——也就是说,参与到“构成”一个特定身体意味着什么之中。由此可以推断,在适当条件下,严格来说无法穿越物理空间的计算机程序,可能比一个会走路、会说话的机器人更具身。
英文摘要:
Embodiment has recently enjoyed renewed consideration as a means to amplify the faculties of smart machines. Proponents of embodiment seem to imply that optimizing for movement in physical space promotes something more than the acquisition of niche capabilities for solving problems in physical space. However, there is nothing in principle which should so distinguish the problem of action selection in physical space from the problem of action selection in more abstract spaces, like that of language. Rather, what makes embodiment persuasive as a means toward higher intelligence is that it promises to capture, but does not actually realize, contingent facts about certain bodies (living intelligence) and the patterns of activity associated with them. These include an active resistance to annihilation and revisable constraints on the processes that make the world intelligible. To be theoretically or practically useful beyond the creation of niche tools, we argue that "embodiment" cannot be the trivial fact of a body, nor its movement through space, but the perpetual negotiation of the function, design, and integrity of that body$\unicode{x2013}$that is, to participate in what it means to $\textit{constitute}$ a given body. It follows that computer programs which are strictly incapable of traversing physical space might, under the right conditions, be more embodied than a walking, talking robot.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。