解开协调问题
Unraveling Coordination Problems
AI总结:
本文通过将政策设计与均衡选择联系,刻画诱导唯一均衡的最优补贴方案,发现其具有唯一性、对称性、连续性且不使策略严格占优,收益不确定性促使政策温和。
摘要:
在协调博弈中,策略不确定性使政策设计变得复杂。为了控制策略不确定性,本文中的规划者将政策设计问题与均衡选择问题联系起来。我们刻画了补贴方案,该方案诱导博弈在给定结果上协调,并使其成为唯一均衡。最优补贴是唯一的,对相同参与者是对称的,是模型参数的连续函数,并且不会使目标策略对任何单个参与者严格占优;这些性质与文献中的经典结果截然不同。关于收益的不确定性促使政策趋于温和,因为过于激进的干预本身可能诱发协调失败。JEL代码:D81, D82, D83, D86, H20。关键词:机制设计,全局博弈,外部性契约,唯一实施。
英文摘要:
Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme that induces coordination on a given outcome of the game as its unique equilibrium. Optimal subsidies are unique, symmetric for identical players, continuous functions of model parameters, and do not make the targeted strategies strictly dominant for any one player; these properties differ starkly from canonical results in the literature. Uncertainty about payoffs impels policy moderation as overly aggressive intervention might itself induce coordination failure. JEL codes: D81, D82, D83, D86, H20. Keywords: mechanism design, global games, contracting with externalities, unique implementation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。