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arXiv 2307.04029cs.AI
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论完美信息博弈中的“无差异”与逆向归纳

On "Indifference" and Backward Induction in Games with Perfect Information

IBM Almaden Research Center(IBM阿尔马登研究中心)

Nimrod Megiddo

AI总结:

本文研究完美信息博弈中参与者无差异导致的逆向归纳难题,提出基于其他参与者效用的理性精化方法,并以“以牙还牙”概念解决理性选择之间的平局问题。

摘要:

博弈中,参与者对两个不同结果的无差异无法通过微小扰动来处理,因为实际选择可能对其他参与者产生重大影响,并导致他们以对无差异参与者产生重大影响的方式行动。本文论证,理性选择之间的平局可以通过基于其他参与者效用的理性概念精化来解决。其中一种精化是“以牙还牙”(Tit-for-Tat)概念。

英文摘要:

Indifference of a player with respect to two distinct outcomes of a game cannot be handled by small perturbations, because the actual choice may have significant impact on other players, and cause them to act in a way that has significant impact of the indifferent player. It is argued that ties among rational choices can be resolved by refinements of the concept of rationality based on the utilities of other players. One such refinement is the concept of Tit-for-Tat.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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