arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2307.01623math.PRmath.OC
收藏

一个具有隐藏控制者类型的控制者-停止者博弈

A controller-stopper-game with hidden controller type

Andi Bodnariu, Kristoffer Lindensjö

AI总结:

本文研究资产所有者与隐藏类型管理者之间的连续时间随机停止-控制博弈,利用随机滤波方法刻画纳什均衡,并证明强表述下的阈值均衡在弱表述下仍然成立。

摘要:

我们考虑一个连续时间随机动态博弈,博弈双方为停止者(参与者1,即产生收入的资产的“所有者”)和控制者(参与者2,即该资产的“管理者”),其中管理者要么是有效的,要么是无效的。有效管理者可以选择付出低努力或高努力,这对应于所有者累积收入在布朗运动随机噪声下的高或低正漂移;其中高努力对管理者而言需要付出成本。管理者赚取薪水,直到博弈被所有者停止,此后也不再产生收入。无效管理者不能采取行动,但仍能获得薪水。针对这一博弈,我们利用随机滤波方法研究(纳什)均衡;特别地,在均衡中,管理者控制所有者(关于管理者类型)的学习速率。首先,我们考虑该博弈的强表述,这需要对容许控制施加限制性假设,并找到一个(双重)阈值型均衡。其次,我们考虑弱表述,其中考虑了一般的容许控制集合。我们证明,强表述下的阈值均衡在弱表述下也是一个均衡。

英文摘要:

We consider a continuous time stochastic dynamic game between a stopper (Player $1$, the \textit{owner} of an asset yielding an income) and a controller (Player $2$, the \textit{manager} of the asset), where the manager is either effective or non-effective. An effective manager can choose to exert low or high effort which corresponds to a high or a low positive drift for the accumulated income of the owner with random noise in terms of Brownian motion; where high effort comes at a cost for the manager. The manager earns a salary until the game is stopped by the owner, after which also no income is earned. A non-effective manager cannot act but still receives a salary. For this game we study (Nash) equilibria using stochastic filtering methods; in particular, in equilibrium the manager controls the learning rate (regarding the manager type) of the owner. First, we consider a strong formulation of the game which requires restrictive assumptions for the admissible controls, and find an equilibrium of (double) threshold type. Second, we consider a weak formulation, where a general set of admissible controls is considered. We show that the threshold equilibrium of the strong formulation is also an equilibrium in the weak formulation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑