基于预检查序列的切换期间伪基站检测：一种物理层安全方案
Precheck Sequence Based False Base Station Detection During Handover: A Physical Layer Security Scheme
AI总结：
针对蜂窝网络切换中的伪基站攻击，提出基于预检查序列的物理层安全检测方案，通过附加符号验证保障合法基站切换，仿真性能优于现有方案。
摘要：
伪基站（FBS）攻击自2G时代以来一直是蜂窝网络面临的严重安全问题。在切换过程中，用户设备（UE）周期性地从周围基站（BS）接收状态信息，并将其上传至源基站。源基站比较上传的信号功率，并将UE切换到能够提供最强信号的另一个基站。伪基站可以以适当的功率发射信号，吸引UE连接到它。本文基于3GPP标准，提出了一种基于预检查序列的检测（PSD）方案，以保障UE合法基站（LBS）切换的安全性。该方案首先分析接收信号在块和符号层面的结构。在当前信号序列中添加若干附加符号用于验证。通过设计一个长的符号序列表，每个需要切换的UE将从该表中分配一个特定序列。仿真结果表明，即使为伪基站设计了特定的发射功率，该PSD方案的性能也优于现有任何方案。
英文摘要：
False Base Station (FBS) attack has been a severe security problem for the cellular network since 2G era. During handover, the user equipment (UE) periodically receives state information from surrounding base stations (BSs) and uploads it to the source BS. The source BS compares the uploaded signal power and shifts UE to another BS that can provide the strongest signal. An FBS can transmit signal with the proper power and attract UE to connect to it. In this paper, based on the 3GPP standard, a Precheck Sequence-based Detection (PSD) Scheme is proposed to secure the transition of legal base station (LBS) for UE. This scheme first analyzes the structure of received signals in blocks and symbols. Several additional symbols are added to the current signal sequence for verification. By designing a long table of symbol sequence, every UE which needs handover will be allocated a specific sequence from this table. The simulation results show that the performance of this PSD Scheme is better than that of any existing ones, even when a specific transmit power is designed for FBS.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
