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arXiv 2306.16652cs.CR
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TimeClave:飞地内的遗忘式时间序列处理系统

TimeClave: Oblivious In-enclave Time series Processing System

K. Bagher, S. Cui, X. Yuan, C. Rudolph, X. Yi

AI总结:

提出TimeClave,一个基于Intel SGX和读优化ORAM的飞地内遗忘式时间序列处理系统,在保护数据安全的同时实现了低延迟和高吞吐量。

摘要:

云平台被许多系统广泛采用,例如时间序列处理系统,用于存储和处理海量敏感时间序列数据。遗憾的是,多起事件表明,云平台容易受到内部和外部攻击,从而导致严重的数据泄露。采用同态加密和安全多方计算等加密协议,会给查询操作带来极高的计算和网络开销。我们提出了TimeClave,一个完全遗忘的飞地内时间序列处理系统:TimeClave利用Intel SGX支持对时间序列进行聚合统计,且在飞地内的内存消耗极低。为了隐藏飞地内的访问模式,我们引入了一种名为RoORAM的非阻塞读优化ORAM。TimeClave集成了RoORAM,以高性能地遗忘且安全地处理客户端查询。在聚合时间间隔为$10s$、$2^{14}$个汇总数据块和8个聚合函数的条件下,TimeClave运行点查询耗时$0.03ms$,50个区间的范围查询耗时$0.46ms$。与ORAM基线相比,TimeClave实现了更低的查询延迟(最高降低$2.5\ imes$)和更高的吞吐量(最高提升$2\ imes$),每秒查询量最高达22K。

英文摘要:

Cloud platforms are widely adopted by many systems, such as time series processing systems, to store and process massive amounts of sensitive time series data. Unfortunately, several incidents have shown that cloud platforms are vulnerable to internal and external attacks that lead to critical data breaches. Adopting cryptographic protocols such as homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation adds high computational and network overhead to query operations. We present TimeClave, a fully oblivious in-enclave time series processing system: TimeClave leverages Intel SGX to support aggregate statistics on time series with minimal memory consumption inside the enclave. To hide the access pattern inside the enclave, we introduce a non-blocking read-optimised ORAM named RoORAM. TimeClave integrates RoORAM to obliviously and securely handle client queries with high performance. With an aggregation time interval of $10s$, $2^{14}$ summarised data blocks and 8 aggregate functions, TimeClave run point query in $0.03ms$ and a range query of 50 intervals in $0.46ms$. Compared to the ORAM baseline, TimeClave achieves lower query latency by up to $2.5\times$ and up to $2\times$ throughput, with up to 22K queries per second.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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