Poster:数字中无安全:Signal中密封发送者群组的流量分析
Poster: No safety in numbers: traffic analysis of sealed-sender groups in Signal
AI总结:
本研究将Martiny等人针对Signal的Sealed Sender机制的流量分析攻击,从去匿名化通信对扩展至去匿名化整个群组对话,揭示了群组元数据的安全风险。
摘要:
安全消息应用通常通过端到端加密技术保护用户消息免受观察者窥探,从而为用户提供隐私保护。然而,谁与谁通信的元数据无法仅靠加密来隐藏。Signal的Sealed Sender机制试图通过混淆使用该协议发送的任何消息的发送者来增强对此类数据的保护。然而,Martiny等人指出,由于Signal的消息传递协议,仅凭谁接收消息的记录就足以恢复这些元数据。在本研究中,我们将此前提出的攻击从去匿名化通信对扩展至去匿名化整个群组对话。
英文摘要:
Secure messaging applications often offer privacy to users by protecting their messages from would be observers through end-to-end encryption techniques. However, the metadata of who communicates with whom cannot be concealed by encryption alone. Signal's Sealed Sender mechanism attempts to enhance its protection of this data by obfuscating the sender of any message sent with the protocol. However, it was shown by Martiny et al. that due to the message delivery protocols in Signal, the record of who receives messages can be enough to recover this metadata. In this work we extend the attack presented from deanonymizing communicating pairs to deanonymizing entire group conversations.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。