论常和拥塞博弈中双寡头的普遍存在性
On the ubiquity of duopolies in constant sum congestion games
AI总结：
本文研究可拥塞服务提供商的常和联盟形成博弈，证明经典稳定性下无稳定划分，并在更受限的阻止概念下刻画重载与轻载情形中的稳定双寡头。
摘要：
我们分析了可拥塞服务的策略性服务提供商之间的联盟形成博弈。我们建模的关键新颖之处在于它是一个常和博弈，即所有服务提供商（或提供商联盟）的总收益是固定的，并由市场规模决定。因此，该博弈刻画了资源池化（以受益于由此产生的统计规模经济）与联盟之间围绕市场份额的竞争之间的张力。与以往关于可拥塞服务资源池化的文献不同，我们表明，一旦允许围绕市场份额展开竞争，大联盟通常并不稳定。事实上，在经典稳定性概念（通过任意联盟的阻止来定义）下，我们证明不存在稳定的划分。这促使我们引入更受限（且更相关）的阻止概念；有趣的是，我们发现在这些新颖的稳定性概念下，稳定配置是双寡头，其中占主导地位的联盟利用其规模经济攫取不成比例的市场份额。此外，我们完整刻画了重载和轻载流量情形下的稳定双寡头。
英文摘要：
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of providers) is fixed, and dictated by the size of the market. The game thus captures the tension between resource pooling (to benefit from the resulting statistical economies of scale) and competition between coalitions over market share. In a departure from the prior literature on resource pooling for congestible services, we show that the grand coalition is in general not stable, once we allow for competition over market share. In fact, under classical notions of stability (defined via blocking by any coalition), we show that no partition is stable. This motivates us to introduce more restricted (and relevant) notions of blocking; interestingly, we find that the stable configurations under these novel notions of stability are duopolies, where the dominant coalition exploits its economies of scale to corner a disproportionate market share. Furthermore, we completely characterise the stable duopolies in heavy and light traffic regimes.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
