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测量与规避土库曼斯坦互联网审查:对一个低普及率国家进行大规模测量的案例研究

Measuring and Evading Turkmenistan's Internet Censorship: A Case Study in Large-Scale Measurements of a Low-Penetration Country

Sadia Nourin, Van Tran, Xi Jiang, Kevin Bock, Nick Feamster, Nguyen Phong Hoang, Dave Levin

AI总结:

本文开发了无需境内观测点的TMC工具,对土库曼斯坦1550万个域名进行大规模测量,发现其审查超12.2万个域名并逆向识别出过度封锁规则,同时提出五种可突破其传输层和应用层审查的规避策略。

摘要:

自2006年以来,土库曼斯坦因其广泛审查的互联网和严格管控的信息控制政策,一直被无国界记者组织列为少数几个“互联网敌人”之一。现有的关于土库曼斯坦过滤行为的报告仅依赖少量观测点或仅测试少量网站。然而,该国较低的互联网采用率和较少的人口使得更全面的测量变得困难。由于人口仅有600万,互联网普及率仅为38%,无论是招募境内志愿者还是获取观测点以开展大规模远程网络测量都极具挑战性。我们提出了迄今为止规模最大的土库曼斯坦网络审查测量研究。为此,我们开发了TMC,该工具能够在Web的三种基础协议(DNS、HTTP和HTTPS)上测试数百万个域名的封锁状态。重要的是,TMC不需要位于该国的观测点。我们将TMC应用于1550万个域名,结果显示土库曼斯坦审查了超过12.2万个域名,并对每种协议使用了不同的封锁列表。我们还对这些被审查的域名进行了逆向工程,识别出6000条过度封锁规则,这些规则导致超过540万个域名被附带过滤。最后,我们使用开源审查规避工具Geneva,发现了五种新的审查规避策略,能够在传输层和应用层突破土库曼斯坦的审查。我们将公开发布TMC收集的数据以及审查规避代码。

英文摘要:

Since 2006, Turkmenistan has been listed as one of the few Internet enemies by Reporters without Borders due to its extensively censored Internet and strictly regulated information control policies. Existing reports of filtering in Turkmenistan rely on a small number of vantage points or test a small number of websites. Yet, the country's poor Internet adoption rates and small population can make more comprehensive measurement challenging. With a population of only six million people and an Internet penetration rate of only 38%, it is challenging to either recruit in-country volunteers or obtain vantage points to conduct remote network measurements at scale. We present the largest measurement study to date of Turkmenistan's Web censorship. To do so, we developed TMC, which tests the blocking status of millions of domains across the three foundational protocols of the Web (DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS). Importantly, TMC does not require access to vantage points in the country. We apply TMC to 15.5M domains, our results reveal that Turkmenistan censors more than 122K domains, using different blocklists for each protocol. We also reverse-engineer these censored domains, identifying 6K over-blocking rules causing incidental filtering of more than 5.4M domains. Finally, we use Geneva, an open-source censorship evasion tool, to discover five new censorship evasion strategies that can defeat Turkmenistan's censorship at both transport and application layers. We will publicly release both the data collected by TMC and the code for censorship evasion.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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