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arXiv 2303.09734cs.MAcs.GTecon.TH
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即时复选投票的温和化效应

The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting

Kiran Tomlinson, Johan Ugander, Jon Kleinberg

AI总结:

本文在一维欧几里得选民偏好模型中提出排除区理论,证明 IRV 在选民对称且不极端集中时比相对多数投票更能排除极端候选人,并以计算验证。

摘要:

即时复选投票(IRV)近来作为政治选举中相对多数投票的替代方案而受到欢迎,支持者声称它具有一系列优势,包括它能产生比相对多数投票更温和的获胜者,从而可能有助于解决极化问题。然而,这一主张几乎没有理论支撑,现有证据主要集中于案例研究和模拟。在本文中,我们在一个一维欧几里得选民偏好模型中,以一种精确的意义证明了 IRV 相对于相对多数投票具有温和化效应。我们发展了一种排除区理论,该理论由选民分布的性质推导而来,用于说明温和候选人和极端候选人在 IRV 计票过程中如何相互作用。该理论使我们能够证明,如果选民呈对称分布且不过度集中于极端,IRV 不可能让极端候选人击败温和候选人当选。相比之下,我们表明相对多数投票可能出现这种情况,并通过计算验证了我们的结果。我们的方法为投票系统分析提供了新框架,从几何上推导精确的获胜者分布,并建立了相对多数投票与 stick-breaking(折棍)过程之间的联系。

英文摘要:

Instant runoff voting (IRV) has recently gained popularity as an alternative to plurality voting for political elections, with advocates claiming a range of advantages, including that it produces more moderate winners than plurality and could thus help address polarization. However, there is little theoretical backing for this claim, with existing evidence focused on case studies and simulations. In this work, we prove that IRV has a moderating effect relative to plurality voting in a precise sense, developed in a 1-dimensional Euclidean model of voter preferences. We develop a theory of exclusion zones, derived from properties of the voter distribution, which serve to show how moderate and extreme candidates interact during IRV vote tabulation. The theory allows us to prove that if voters are symmetrically distributed and not too concentrated at the extremes, IRV cannot elect an extreme candidate over a moderate. In contrast, we show plurality can and validate our results computationally. Our methods provide new frameworks for the analysis of voting systems, deriving exact winner distributions geometrically and establishing a connection between plurality voting and stick-breaking processes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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