平均场对策中的社会羊群行为
Social herding in mean field games
摘要:
在本文中,我们考虑了一个平均场模型的社会行为,有一个无限数量的球员,每个人都观察到一个类型,代表她的喜好,私人,并公开观察平均场状态的类型和行动的球员在社会中。参与者的类型(以及相应的偏好)是动态演变的。每个参与者都是完全理性和前瞻性的,并在每一轮中做出购买产品的决定。如果她购买的产品与她当前的偏好一致,如果购买该产品的人比例较高(因此是一个战略互补博弈),她会获得更高的效用。我们表明,对于某些参数时,战略互补性的权重是高的,玩家最终涌向一个行动的概率为1,这是当每个玩家购买一个产品,而不管她的喜好。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we consider a mean field model of social behavior where there are an infinite number of players, each of whom observes a type privately that represents her preference, and publicly observes a mean field state of types and actions of the players in the society. The types (and equivalently preferences) of the players are dynamically evolving. Each player is fully rational and forward-looking and makes a decision in each round t to buy a product. She receives a higher utility if the product she bought is aligned with her current preference and if there is a higher fraction of people who bought that product (thus a game of strategic complementarity). We show that for certain parameters when the weight of strategic complementarity is high, players eventually herd towards one of the actions with probability 1 which is when each player buys a product irrespective of her preference.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。