LiDAR欺骗攻击下自主车辆安全控制的协同感知
Cooperative Perception for Safe Control of Autonomous Vehicles under LiDAR Spoofing Attacks
摘要:
自动驾驶汽车依靠LiDAR传感器来检测行人、其他车辆和固定基础设施等障碍物。LiDAR欺骗攻击已经被证明可以创建错误的障碍物或阻止检测到真正的障碍物,从而导致不安全的驾驶行为。在本文中,我们提出了一种方法来检测和减轻激光雷达欺骗攻击,利用激光雷达扫描数据从其他邻近车辆。这种方法利用了这样一个事实,即欺骗攻击通常一次只能安装在一辆车上,并在受害者的扫描中引入额外的点,这些点可以通过与其他未修改的扫描进行比较而容易地检测到。我们开发了一个故障检测,识别和隔离程序,识别不存在的障碍,物理删除和敌对对象的攻击,同时还估计障碍物的实际位置。我们提出了一种控制算法,保证这些估计的对象位置被避免。我们验证我们的框架使用CARLA模拟研究,在其中我们验证我们的FDII算法正确地检测到每个攻击模式。
英文摘要:
Autonomous vehicles rely on LiDAR sensors to detect obstacles such as pedestrians, other vehicles, and fixed infrastructures. LiDAR spoofing attacks have been demonstrated that either create erroneous obstacles or prevent detection of real obstacles, resulting in unsafe driving behaviors. In this paper, we propose an approach to detect and mitigate LiDAR spoofing attacks by leveraging LiDAR scan data from other neighboring vehicles. This approach exploits the fact that spoofing attacks can typically only be mounted on one vehicle at a time, and introduce additional points into the victim's scan that can be readily detected by comparison from other, non-modified scans. We develop a Fault Detection, Identification, and Isolation procedure that identifies non-existing obstacle, physical removal, and adversarial object attacks, while also estimating the actual locations of obstacles. We propose a control algorithm that guarantees that these estimated object locations are avoided. We validate our framework using a CARLA simulation study, in which we verify that our FDII algorithm correctly detects each attack pattern.
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