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arXiv 2302.05747econ.EM
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序列网络博弈中的个性化治疗分配

Individualized Treatment Allocation in Sequential Network Games

Brown University(布朗大学);Washington University in St. Louis(华盛顿大学圣路易斯分校)

Toru Kitagawa, Guanyi Wang

AI总结:

本文提出通过评估平稳分布来优化治疗分配规则,以最大化社会福利,采用变分近似和贪心算法在序列决策博弈中实现均衡福利最大化,并通过模拟和印度微金融数据验证了显著的福利提升。

摘要:

设计个性化治疗分配以最大化交互代理的均衡福利在政策上有广泛应用。本文聚焦于交互代理的序列决策博弈,开发了一种方法,通过评估结果的平稳分布来获得最优治疗分配规则,以最大化社会福利标准。序列决策博弈中的平稳分布由吉布斯分布给出,由于分析和计算复杂性,难以直接优化治疗分配。我们应用变分近似到平稳分布,并使用贪心优化算法优化近似均衡福利。我们刻画了变分近似的性能,通过福利遗憾界推导出贪心优化算法的性能保证。我们通过模拟实验和使用印度微金融数据(Banerjee等人,2013)的实证应用实现了所提出的方法,并证明其带来了显著的福利提升。

英文摘要:

Designing individualized allocation of treatments so as to maximize the equilibrium welfare of interacting agents has many policy-relevant applications. Focusing on sequential decision games of interacting agents, this paper develops a method to obtain optimal treatment assignment rules that maximize a social welfare criterion by evaluating stationary distributions of outcomes. Stationary distributions in sequential decision games are given by Gibbs distributions, which are difficult to optimize with respect to a treatment allocation due to analytical and computational complexity. We apply a variational approximation to the stationary distribution and optimize the approximated equilibrium welfare with respect to treatment allocation using a greedy optimization algorithm. We characterize the performance of the variational approximation, deriving a performance guarantee for the greedy optimization algorithm via a welfare regret bound. We implement our proposed method in simulation exercises and an empirical application using the Indian microfinance data (Banerjee et al., 2013), and show it delivers significant welfare gains.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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