利用异构传感器检测策略攻击的网络检测
Network Inspection Using Heterogeneous Sensors for Detecting Strategic Attacks
摘要：
我们考虑了一个两人网络检测游戏，在这个游戏中，防御者分配具有潜在异构检测能力的传感器，以检测由战略攻击者引起的多个攻击。辩护人的目的（Resp.）攻击者）是最小化（相应地，最大化）通过选择潜在的随机化检查（相应地，攻击）策略。我们分析了纳什均衡的特点，这个大规模的零和游戏时，每个脆弱的网络组件可以从一个独特的传感器位置进行监测。然后，我们利用我们的平衡分析，设计一个启发式的解决方案的基础上，最小集覆盖计算检查策略一般。我们的基准网络物理分销网络的计算结果说明了我们的解决方案的方法的性能和计算的易处理性。
英文摘要：
We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender (resp. attacker) is to minimize (resp. maximize) the expected number of undetected attacks by selecting a potentially randomized inspection (resp. attack) strategy. We analytically characterize Nash equilibria of this large-scale zero-sum game when every vulnerable network component can be monitored from a unique sensor location. We then leverage our equilibrium analysis to design a heuristic solution approach based on minimum set covers for computing inspection strategies in general. Our computational results on a benchmark cyber-physical distribution network illustrate the performance and computational tractability of our solution approach.
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