对抗性区块链队列和在CFMM上进行交易
Adversarial blockchain queues and trading on a CFMM
摘要：
我们描述了一个合理的概率模型，用于区块链加密环境，在这个环境中，理性的、利润最大化的加密者对包含有效载荷的传入消息施加对抗性纪律，该有效载荷对机器中的状态转换进行编码。该模型可以专门应用于具有固定或可变块时间的链，具有“诚实”队列的传统优先排队规则，或对抗性公共mempools。我们发现的条件下，该模型的行为作为一个批量服务队列的优先级纪律，并推导出实用的表达式的相对块和消息数的事务。我们在CFMM DEX订单的上下文中研究了这种设置，其中用户收到的执行价格可能对其在链中的定位非常敏感-特别是，对于在订单创建时不知道的先前执行的一串交易。我们推导出统计模型的价格影响，这个订单流的存在和不存在的MEV提取活动。
英文摘要：
We describe a plausible probabilistic model for a blockchain queueing environment in which rational, profit-maximising schedulers impose adversarial disciplines on incoming messages containing a payload that encodes a state transition in a machine. The model can be specialised to apply to chains with fixed or variable block times, traditional priority queue disciplines with `honest' schedulers, or adversarial public mempools. We find conditions under which the model behaves as a bulk-service queue with priority discipline and derive practical expressions for the relative block and message number of a transaction. We study this setup in the context of orders to a CFMM DEX where the execution price a user receives may be quite sensitive to its positioning in the chain -- in particular, to a string of transactions scheduled for prior execution which is not knowable at the time of order creation. We derive statistical models for the price impact of this order flow both in the presence and absence of MEV extraction activity.
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