零杠杆之谜

摘要：

在本文中，我将研究为什么有些公司的杠杆率为零。我没有找到证据表明，公司是由于管理防御，因为这些公司没有较弱的公司治理杠杆。我不同意公司在长期高市场估值后成为零杠杆的假设，因为在杠杆化之前，这些公司不会遭受估值下降的影响，并继续发行大量股票。我发现了强有力的证据支持财务约束对零杠杆之谜的解释。使用三种不同的财务约束措施，零杠杆公司似乎受到财务约束。我得到的财务灵活性假说的混合证据，因为全股权公司增加投资和收购后，杠杆，但他们的杠杆的概率下降，在金融危机。我的研究结果表明，财务约束是零杠杆行为的第一驱动因素，并且比管理防御等不太明显的解释更重要。

英文摘要：

In this paper, I examine why some firms have zero leverage. I fail to find evidence that firms are unlevered because of managerial entrenchment since these firms do not have weaker corporate governance. I reject the hypothesis that firms become zero-leverage after prolonged periods of high market valuation, since before levering these firms do not suffer from declining valuations and continue to issue large amounts of equity. I find strong evidence in favor of the financial constraints explanation of the zero-leverage puzzle. Zero-leverage firms appear to be financially constrained using three different measures of financial constraints. I obtain mixed evidence on the financial flexibility hypothesis since all-equity firms increase investments and acquisitions after levering, but the probability of their levering decreased during the financial crisis. My results suggest that financial constraints are the first-order the driver of zero-leverage behavior and are more important than less obvious explanations such as managerial entrenchment.

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