提供算法补救的激励
Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse
AI总结:
本文通过筛选模型研究决策者提供算法补救的激励,发现最优策略为阈值规则,即拒绝低分、对中等分数提供补救、直接接受高分,该规则使部分边缘申请人受益,但也给原本被接受者增加成本。
摘要:
算法补救承诺通过解释获得接受所需的变更,帮助被自动化系统拒绝的申请人。决策者(如银行和雇主)有什么激励提供补救?我们在一个筛选模型中研究这个问题,在该模型中,补救既具有生产性又具有选择性:完成补救能提高申请人对决策者的价值,但申请人完成补救的成本各不相同。最优策略是一个阈值规则:拒绝低分申请人,向中等分数范围的申请人提供补救,并直接接受高分申请人。由于中等范围跨越了在没有补救时区分接受与拒绝的临界点,一些边缘申请人获得了新的接受途径,而另一些——原本会被直接接受的人——现在必须跨越一个昂贵的障碍。
英文摘要:
Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。