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arXiv 2301.08018cs.CRcs.AR
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持续攻击后的片上系统恢复

System on Chip Rejuvenation in the Wake of Persistent Attacks

Ahmad T Sheikh, Ali Shoker, Paulo Esteves-Verissimo

摘要:

为了应对不断增长的动态和自适应持续攻击的威胁,容错和入侵容忍(FIT)正在研究在硬件层面上,以提高关键系统的弹性。基于状态机复制,如果副本受到损害并独立失败,则FIT已知是有效的。这就需要在软件和硬件两级采取不同的多样化方式。在本文中,我们介绍了第一个基于硬件的复兴框架,我们称之为“复兴”,它允许创建具有不同架构的新计算核心(FIT副本在其上运行)。这是通过利用FPGA的MPSoC的可编程和可重新配置功能而实现的。分析和利用核心漏洞的持续攻击将无法利用它,因为恢复到不同的核心架构的速度足够快。我们讨论了这种设计的可行性,我们留下的经验评估为今后的工作。

英文摘要:

To cope with the ever increasing threats of dynamic and adaptive persistent attacks, Fault and Intrusion Tolerance (FIT) is being studied at the hardware level to increase critical systems resilience. Based on state-machine replication, FIT is known to be effective if replicas are compromised and fail independently. This requires different ways of diversification at the software and hardware levels. In this paper, we introduce the first hardware-based rejuvenation framework, we call Samsara, that allows for creating new computing cores (on which FIT replicas run) with diverse architectures. This is made possible by taking advantage of the programmable and reconfigurable features of MPSoC with an FPGA. A persistent attack that analyzes and exploits the vulnerability of a core will not be able to exploit it as rejuvenation to a different core architecture is made fast enough. We discuss the feasibility of this design, and we leave the empirical evaluations for future work.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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