通过二次转移提高集体决策效率
Efficiency in Collective Decision-Making via Quadratic Transfers
摘要：
考虑以下集体选择问题：一组预算受限的代理人必须选择几个选项之一。是否存在一种预算平衡机制：i）不依赖于群体的具体特征，ii）不需要负担不起的转移，iii）如果代理人的偏好是准线性的，并且他们的私人信息是私人信息，则实施功利主义？我们研究以下程序：每个代理人可以表达任何强度的支持或反对每个选项，通过转移到其余的代理人的财富等于强度的平方表示;和结果是由所表示的强度的总和。我们证明，随着集团的增长大，在这个二次转移机制的每一个平衡，每个代理的转移收敛到零，并选择有效的结果的概率收敛到1。
英文摘要：
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not require unaffordable transfers, and iii) implements utilitarianism if the agents' preferences are quasilinear and their private information? We study the following procedure: every agent can express any intensity of support or opposition to each alternative, by transferring to the rest of the agents wealth equal to the square of the intensity expressed; and the outcome is determined by the sums of the expressed intensities. We prove that as the group grows large, in every equilibrium of this quadratic-transfers mechanism, each agent's transfer converges to zero, and the probability that the efficient outcome is chosen converges to one.
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