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arXiv 2301.05397cs.AIcs.CYq-bio.NC
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AI意识的问题:一个反对合成感知的神经发生学案例

The problem with AI consciousness: A neurogenetic case against synthetic sentience

Kalaidos University of Applied Sciences(卡拉多斯应用科学大学);University of Fribourg(弗里堡大学);University Hospital for Psychiatry Bern(伯尔尼大学精神病医院);University of Bern(伯尔尼大学)

Yoshija Walter, Lukas Zbinden

摘要:

自从第一个基于机器学习(ML)的人工智能(AI)机器诞生以来,公众社会就一直认为,最终计算机可以变得有知觉,并发展出自己的意识。随着这些模型变得越来越好,令人信服地更具拟人化,甚至一些工程师也开始相信人工智能可能会变得有意识,这将导致严重的社会后果。本文主要基于神经发生结构主义的理论来反对有感觉的人工智能的可解释性,该理论声称生物神经元的生理学及其复杂大脑的结构组织是真正意识出现的必要先决条件。

英文摘要:

Ever since the creation of the first artificial intelligence (AI) machinery built on machine learning (ML), public society has entertained the idea that eventually computers could become sentient and develop a consciousness of their own. As these models now get increasingly better and convincingly more anthropomorphic, even some engineers have started to believe that AI might become conscious, which would result in serious social consequences. The present paper argues against the plausibility of sentient AI primarily based on the theory of neurogenetic structuralism, which claims that the physiology of biological neurons and their structural organization into complex brains are necessary prerequisites for true consciousness to emerge.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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