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arXiv 2212.09889econ.TH
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战略观察学习

Strategic Observational Learning

Dimitri Migrow

摘要:

我们研究了在一个简单的社会学习的重复动作设置的私人知情的前瞻性代理的学习。在对称信号结构下,前瞻性代理人的行为近视任何程度的耐心。近视均衡在对称阈值策略类中是唯一的,也是最简单的对称非单调策略。如果信号结构是不对称的,博弈是无限的,那么对于任何正的耐心程度,短视策略都不存在均衡。

英文摘要:

We study learning by privately informed forward-looking agents in a simple repeated-action setting of social learning. Under a symmetric signal structure, forward-looking agents behave myopically for any degrees of patience. Myopic equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric threshold strategies, and the simplest symmetric non-monotonic strategies. If the signal structure is asymmetric and the game is infinite, there is no equilibrium in myopic strategies, for any positive degree of patience.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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