跨区域泄漏条件下二氧化碳清除的最优定价
Optimal pricing for carbon dioxide removal under inter-regional leakage
摘要：
二氧化碳清除（CDR）将大气中的碳转移到地质或陆基汇。在第一最佳设置中，CDR的最佳使用是通过等于最佳碳税和边际损害的清除补贴来实现的。当不存在全球碳价格但国家政府实施单边气候政策时，我们得出了CDR补贴和碳税的次优政策规则。我们发现，最优的碳税不同于最优的CDR补贴，因为碳泄漏和资源贸易平衡的影响。首先，最佳清除补贴往往大于碳税，因为化石资源市场的供应方泄漏较低。第二，净碳出口国加剧了这一楔子，以增加其碳资源生产者的生产者剩余，这意味着更大的清除补贴。第三，当边际环境损害很小时，净碳进口国可以将其清除补贴设定为甚至低于其碳税，以挪用碳出口国的生产者剩余。
英文摘要：
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) moves atmospheric carbon to geological or land-based sinks. In a first-best setting, the optimal use of CDR is achieved by a removal subsidy that equals the optimal carbon tax and marginal damages. We derive second-best policy rules for CDR subsidies and carbon taxes when no global carbon price exists but a national government implements a unilateral climate policy. We find that the optimal carbon tax differs from an optimal CDR subsidy because of carbon leakage and a balance of resource trade effect. First, the optimal removal subsidy tends to be larger than the carbon tax because of lower supply-side leakage on fossil resource markets. Second, net carbon exporters exacerbate this wedge to increase producer surplus of their carbon resource producers, implying even larger removal subsidies. Third, net carbon importers may set their removal subsidy even below their carbon tax when marginal environmental damages are small, to appropriate producer surplus from carbon exporters.
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