公共物品博弈的一种反向形式：等价与差异
A reversed form of public goods game: equivalence and difference
摘要：
根据公共物品博弈（PGG）协议，参与者可以自由决定是否向公共资金池捐款，但由此产生的收益是平均分配的。当参与者考虑他们是否要求共同资源，但相关费用由所有小组成员平等支付时，可能会出现概念上类似的困境。后者建立了一个原始的公共产品博弈（R-PGG）的反向形式。在这项工作中，我们表明，R-PGG是等价于PGG在几种情况下，从传统的分析，通过在非结构化人口的进化方法，结构化人口的蒙特卡罗模拟。然而，也有一些情况下，R-PGG的行为可能与PGG的结果惊人地不同。例如，当关键参数不均匀时，即使我们采用相同的不均匀幅度，PGG和R-PGG的结果也可能不同。我们发现，在R-PGG的异质性一般阻碍合作，而PGG观察到相反的情况。这些不同的系统反应可以理解，如果我们遵循如何支付函数的变化时，引入异质性的参数空间。这一分析还揭示了合作者和背叛者策略在上述博弈中的不同作用。我们的观察可能会激发进一步的研究，以检查由于条件的替代复杂性导致的PGG和R-PGG之间的电势差。
英文摘要：
According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge when participants consider if they claim a common resource but the related cost is covered equally by all group members. The latter establishes a reversed form of the original public goods game (R-PGG). In this work, we show that R-PGG is equivalent to PGG in several circumstances, starting from the traditional analysis, via the evolutionary approach in unstructured populations, to Monte Carlo simulations in structured populations. However, there are also cases when the behavior of R-PGG could be surprisingly different from the outcome of PGG. When the key parameters are heterogeneous, for instance, the results of PGG and R-PGG could be diverse even if we apply the same amplitudes of heterogeneity. We find that the heterogeneity in R-PGG generally impedes cooperation, while the opposite is observed for PGG. These diverse system reactions can be understood if we follow how payoff functions change when introducing heterogeneity in the parameter space. This analysis also reveals the distinct roles of cooperator and defector strategies in the mentioned games. Our observations may hopefully stimulate further research to check the potential differences between PGG and R-PGG due to the alternative complexity of conditions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
