COVID位:保持距离(至少)2米,从我的空气间隙计算机!
COVID-bit: Keep a Distance of (at least) 2m From My Air-Gap Computer!
摘要:
由于处理的是敏感信息,空气隔离系统与Internet隔离。本文介绍了COVID位,一种新的COVert信道攻击,通过空中从高度隔离的系统泄漏敏感信息。这些信息从空气间隙的计算机在空中传播到2米或更远的距离,并可以被附近的内部人员或间谍用手机或笔记本电脑获取。恶意软件可以通过在目标系统上执行精心编制的代码来生成无线电波。恶意代码利用现代计算机的动态功耗,并操纵CPU内核上的瞬时负载。这种技术允许恶意软件控制计算机的内部使用,并在0 - 60 kHz频段产生低频电磁辐射。敏感信息(例如,文件、加密密钥、生物统计数据和键盘记录)可以在所发出的信号上被调制,并由附近的移动电话以1000比特/秒的最大速度接收。我们表明,恶意内部人员或访问者携带的带有1美元天线的智能手机或笔记本电脑可以用作隐蔽接收器。值得注意的是,该攻击是高度规避的,因为它从普通的用户级进程执行,不需要root权限,甚至在虚拟机(VM)中也有效。我们将讨论攻击模型并提供技术细节。实现了文本和文件的气隙传输,并给出了信号的产生和数据的调制。我们测试了隐蔽通道并显示了评估结果。最后,我们提出了一套对策,这种气隙攻击。
英文摘要:
Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitive information they handle. This paper presents COVID-bit, a new COVert channel attack that leaks sensitive information over the air from highly isolated systems. The information emanates from the air-gapped computer over the air to a distance of 2m and more and can be picked up by a nearby insider or spy with a mobile phone or laptop. Malware on an air-gapped computer can generate radio waves by executing crafted code on the target system. The malicious code exploits the dynamic power consumption of modern computers and manipulates the momentary loads on CPU cores. This technique allows the malware to control the computer's internal utilization and generate low-frequency electromagnetic radiation in the 0 - 60 kHz band. Sensitive information (e.g., files, encryption keys, biometric data, and keylogging) can be modulated over the emanated signals and received by a nearby mobile phone at a max speed of 1000 bits/sec. We show that a smartphone or laptop with a small \$1 antenna carried by a malicious insider or visitor can be used as a covert receiver. Notably, the attack is highly evasive since it executes from an ordinary user-level process, does not require root privileges, and is effective even within a Virtual Machine (VM). We discuss the attack model and provide technical details. We implement air-gap transmission of texts and files, and present signal generation and data modulation. We test the covert channel and show evaluation results. Finally, we present a set of countermeasures to this air-gap attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。