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arXiv 2212.01855cs.CR
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配对友好的椭圆曲线:重新审视分类、攻击和安全问题

Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves: Revisited Taxonomy, Attacks and Security Concern

Mahender Kumar, Satish Chand

摘要:

最近,包括BN、BLS12、BLS24、KSS16和KSS18在内的主要配对友好椭圆曲线家族都容易受到数域筛(NFS)攻击。由于最近对F_(q^k)中离散对数的攻击,选择这样的曲线再次变得重要。本文重新讨论了在不同安全级别选择配对友好曲线的主题。首先,我们扩展了Freeman等人给出的分类。[1]通过识别以前没有提到的新族,例如具有可变微分的完整族和新的稀疏曲线族。我们讨论了单个曲线和构造参数族的综合框架。我们估计了安全性并评估了配对友好曲线的族,以发现在所需密钥大小方面优于BN、KSS和BLS的曲线族。我们还评估了最佳ate配对的复杂性,除了Barbulescu等人之外,以前从未讨论过。我们证明了最近对配对的攻击(TNFS)需要增加密钥大小。我们在密钥大小的上下文中比较了曲线族,并选择了椭圆曲线的合适替代方案。

英文摘要:

Major families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, including BN, BLS12, BLS24, KSS16, and KSS18 have recently been vulnerable to number field sieve (NFS) attacks. Due to the recent attacks on discrete logs in F_(q^k ), selecting such curves became relevant again. This paper revisited the topic of selecting pairing-friendly curves at different security levels. First, we expanded the classification given by Freeman et al. [1] by identifying new families that were not previously mentioned, such as a complete family with variable differentiation and new sparse families of curves. We discussed individual curves and a comprehensive framework for constructing parametric families. We estimated the security and assessed families of the pairing-friendly curve to discover families of curves better than BN, KSS, and BLS in terms of the required key size. We also evaluated the complexity of the optimal ate pairing that has never been discussed before, except by Barbulescu et al. [2]. We demonstrated that the recent attack (TNFS) on pairing needs to increase the key size. We compared families of curves in the context of key size and selected a suitable alternative to an elliptic curve.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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