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arXiv 2211.08291eess.SPcs.ITmath.IT
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攻击与防御基于深度学习的离设备无线定位系统

Attacking and Defending Deep-Learning-Based Off-Device Wireless Positioning Systems

Pengzhi Huang, Emre Gönültaş, Maximilian Arnold, K. Pavan Srinath, Jakob Hoydis, Christoph Studer

AI总结:

本文提出在设备端对基于深度学习的离设备无线定位系统发起标准兼容且最小化服务质量影响的攻击,并在真实蜂窝与无线局域网数据集中验证其有效性,同时探讨相应防御机制及位置隐私保护的局限与影响。

摘要:

无线设备的定位服务在我们的日常生活中发挥着日益重要的作用,大量新兴服务和应用已经依赖精确的位置信息。广泛使用的在设备定位方法(如全球定位系统)能够实现精确的室外定位,并让用户完全控制哪些服务和应用可以访问其位置信息。为了在没有卫星视距连接的室内或杂乱城市场景中提供精确的定位,强大的离设备定位系统最近已经出现,这些系统利用深度神经网络处理在基础设施基站或接入点处测量的信道状态信息(CSI)。这种离设备无线定位系统本质上将用户的数据传输与其定位联系在一起,因为精确的CSI测量对于可靠的无线通信是必要的——这不仅使用户无法控制谁可以访问这些信息,而且实际上使设备范围内的几乎任何人都能够估计其位置,从而引发严重的隐私和安全问题。因此,我们提出在多天线正交频分复用系统中针对离设备无线定位系统的在设备攻击,同时保持标准兼容并最小化对服务质量的影响,并使用真实世界测量的蜂窝室外和无线局域网室内场景数据集证明了这些攻击的有效性。我们还研究了对抗此类攻击机制的防御措施,并讨论了在现有和未来无线通信系统中保护位置隐私的局限性和影响。

英文摘要:

Localization services for wireless devices play an increasingly important role in our daily lives and a plethora of emerging services and applications already rely on precise position information. Widely used on-device positioning methods, such as the global positioning system, enable accurate outdoor positioning and provide the users with full control over what services and applications are allowed to access their location information. In order to provide accurate positioning indoors or in cluttered urban scenarios without line-of-sight satellite connectivity, powerful off-device positioning systems, which process channel state information (CSI) measured at the infrastructure base stations or access points with deep neural networks, have emerged recently. Such off-device wireless positioning systems inherently link a user's data transmission with its localization, since accurate CSI measurements are necessary for reliable wireless communication -- this not only prevents the users from controlling who can access this information but also enables virtually everyone in the device's range to estimate its location, resulting in serious privacy and security concerns. We therefore propose on-device attacks against off-device wireless positioning systems in multi-antenna orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing systems while remaining standard compliant and minimizing the impact on quality-of-service, and we demonstrate their efficacy using real-world measured datasets for cellular outdoor and wireless LAN indoor scenarios. We also investigate defenses to counter such attack mechanisms, and we discuss the limitations and implications on protecting location privacy in existing and future wireless communication systems.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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