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arXiv 2211.00065cs.CYcs.AI
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人工智能与军备控制

Artificial Intelligence and Arms Control

Center for a New American Security(新美国安全中心)

Paul Scharre, Megan Lamberth

摘要:

人工智能(AI)的潜在进步可能对各国如何研究和开发武器系统以及军队如何在战场上部署这些系统产生深远影响。人工智能军事系统的想法促使一些活动家呼吁限制或禁止某些武器系统,而其他人则认为人工智能可能过于分散而无法控制。本文认为,虽然禁止人工智能的所有军事应用可能是不可行的,但在某些特定情况下,军备控制是可能的。纵观历史,国际社会出于各种原因试图禁止或管制武器或军事系统。本文分析了成功和失败,并提供了几个标准,似乎影响为什么军备控制在某些情况下,而不是其他工作。我们认为,成功或失败取决于可取性(即,武器的军事价值与其感知的可怕性)和可行性(即,影响其成功的社会政治因素)。基于这些标准,以及过去军备控制尝试的历史记录,我们分析了未来人工智能军备控制的潜力,并为决策者今天可以做些什么提供了建议。

英文摘要:

Potential advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could have profound implications for how countries research and develop weapons systems, and how militaries deploy those systems on the battlefield. The idea of AI-enabled military systems has motivated some activists to call for restrictions or bans on some weapon systems, while others have argued that AI may be too diffuse to control. This paper argues that while a ban on all military applications of AI is likely infeasible, there may be specific cases where arms control is possible. Throughout history, the international community has attempted to ban or regulate weapons or military systems for a variety of reasons. This paper analyzes both successes and failures and offers several criteria that seem to influence why arms control works in some cases and not others. We argue that success or failure depends on the desirability (i.e., a weapon's military value versus its perceived horribleness) and feasibility (i.e., sociopolitical factors that influence its success) of arms control. Based on these criteria, and the historical record of past attempts at arms control, we analyze the potential for AI arms control in the future and offer recommendations for what policymakers can do today.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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