arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2210.17399cs.CRcs.GT
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你真的需要伪装正常的服务器作为蜜罐?

Do You Really Need to Disguise Normal Servers as Honeypots?

Suhyeon Lee, Kwangsoo Cho, Seungjoo Kim

摘要:

蜜罐是一种欺骗策略,已被广泛用于减轻网络威胁至少20年。决策者认为蜜罐策略是直观和有效的,因为蜜罐在现实世界的情况下成功地保护系统免受拒绝服务(DoS)攻击和高级持续性威胁(APT)。然而,在蜜罐技术应用的适当程度上选择现实世界的操作,缺乏研究。我们研究和对比三个攻击防御游戏方面的蜜罐检测技术在本文中。特别是,我们专门设计和对比了蜜罐技术的两个阶段,从一个没有欺骗的游戏开始。我们证明了使用蜜罐的防御者的回报高于没有蜜罐的防御者,尽管防御者可能并不总是从使用更多蜜罐欺骗策略中获得经济利益。特别是,将常规服务器伪装成蜜罐并不能为防御者提供更好的回报。此外,我们考虑到假蜜罐可以使维护正常节点的成本更高。本文的研究为现实世界中运营商确定蜜罐欺骗策略和蜜罐节点数量提供了理论依据。

英文摘要:

A honeypot, which is a kind of deception strategy, has been widely used for at least 20 years to mitigate cyber threats. Decision-makers have believed that honeypot strategies are intuitive and effective, since honeypots have successfully protected systems from Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) in real-world cases. Nonetheless, there is a lack of research on the appropriate level of honeypot technique application to choose real-world operations. We examine and contrast three attack-defense games with respect to honeypot detection techniques in this paper. In particular, we specifically design and contrast two stages of honeypot technology one by one, starting with a game without deception. We demonstrate that the return for a defender using honeypots is higher than for a defender without them, albeit the defender may not always benefit financially from using more honeypot deception strategies. Particularly, disguising regular servers as honeypots does not provide defenders with a better reward. Furthermore, we take in consideration that fake honeypots can make maintaining normal nodes more costly. Our research offers a theoretical foundation for the real-world operator's decision of honeypot deception tactics and the required number of honeypot nodes.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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