沉默的种类:管理金融市场中自愿披露的声誉
The Kind of Silence: Managing a Reputation for Voluntary Disclosure in Financial Markets
摘要:
在一个连续的时间设置,我们研究了如何管理的公司控制两个通用的自愿披露决策规则之间的动态选择:一个与充分和透明的披露称为$\it{candid}$,其他,称为$\it{sparing}$,根据该值仅高于一个动态阈值披露。我们展示了管理层是如何因为坦率而获得声誉溢价的。坦率的策略是昂贵的,因为保守的替代保护公司从潜在的降级后,低价值的披露。我们展示了模型的参数,如新闻强度,按业绩付费和强制披露的时间,决定了最佳选择的坦率与节约战略和管理层之间切换的最佳时间。管理层收到的私人新闻更新采用泊松过程建模,发生在固定的强制披露日期(如财政年度或季度)之间,收到的新闻由经济活动及其部分观察的背景Black-Scholes模型生成。提出的模型开发了一些见解,基于一个非常简单的常微分方程(ODE)表征平衡的分段确定性模型,可从背景Black-Scholes模型。研究表明,在均衡状态下,当新闻强度较低时,公司可能会自始至终采用坦诚的披露策略,但否则会在坦诚时期和保守真相时期(或相反)之间切换(交替);也就是说,我们能够描述处于均衡状态时,坦诚的公司将转向采用保守策略。该模型说明了强制披露的时间、新闻强度和按业绩计薪等参数如何驱动这种转换行为。$\it{With\,constant\,pay\,for\,performance\,parameters,\,at\,most\,one\, switching\,occurs.}$
英文摘要:
In a continuous-time setting we investigate how the management of a firm controls a dynamic choice between two generic voluntary disclosure decision rules: one with full and transparent disclosure termed $\it{candid}$, the other, termed $\it{sparing}$, under which values only above a dynamic threshold are disclosed. We show how management are rewarded with a reputational premium for candour. The candid strategy is costly because the sparing alternative shields the firm from potential downgrades following low value disclosures. We show how parameters of the model such as news intensity, pay-for-performance and time-to-mandatory-disclosure determine the optimal choice of candid versus sparing strategy and the optimal time for management to switch between the two. The private news updates received by management are modelled with a Poisson process, occurring between the fixed mandatory disclosure dates, such as fiscal years or quarters, with the news received generated by a background Black-Scholes model of economic activity and of its partial observation. The model presented develops a number of insights, based on a very simple ordinary differential equation (ODE) characterizing equilibrium in a piecewise-deterministic model, derivable from the background Black-Scholes model. It is shown that in equilibrium when news intensity is low a firm may employ a candid disclosure strategy throughout, but will otherwise switch (alternate) between periods of being candid and periods of being sparing with the truth (or the other way about); that is, we are able to characterize when in equilibrium a candid firm will switch to adopting a sparing strategy. The model illustrates how parameters such as time to mandatory disclosure, news intensity and pay-for-performance may drive such switching behaviour. $\it{With\,constant\,pay\,for\,performance\,parameters,\,at\,most\,one\, switching\,occurs.}$
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