缓解谢林模型中偏析相的动力学合作模型
Dynamical cooperation model for mitigating the segregation phase in Schelling's model
摘要：
我们考虑了一个Schelling隔离模型，其中个体代理的行为是由一个混合的个人和全球的效用。在高比率的整体效用被纳入，代理人是合作的，以实现均匀化的状态，否则代理人是不合作的，导致一个不希望的纳什均衡与低效用。在本研究中，我们引入了一个动态变化的合作度参数，以防止代理人落入这样一个低效用的平衡态。更准确地说，一个大的合作度被分配时，代理在高效用的区域，而代理具有低效用的行为更加个性化。仿真结果表明，即使在合作度平均值较低的情况下，该动态控制也能获得具有全局高效用的均匀相位。由于合作程度代表了皮古税在城市内部居民流动模型中的执行力度，因此这一结果表明了税收干预以规避居民不希望的隔离的可能性。
英文摘要：
We consider a Schelling-like segregation model, in which the behavior of individual agents is determined by a mixed individual and global utility. With a high ratio of global utility being incorporated, the agents are cooperative in order to realize a homogenized state, otherwise the agents are less cooperative, leading to an undesired Nash equilibrium with low utility. In the present study, we introduce a dynamically varying cooperation degree parameter to prevent the agents from falling into such a low-utility equilibrium state. More precisely, a large cooperation degree is assigned when the agents are in high-utility regions, whereas agents having low utility behave more individually. Simulation results show that homogenized phases with globally high utility are achieved with the present dynamical control, even for the case of a low mean value of cooperation degree. Since the cooperation degree represents the magnitude with which Pigouvian tax is enforced in the model of residential movement within a city, this result suggests the possibility of tax intervention to circumvent the undesired segregation of residents.
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