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arXiv 2210.01267econ.THcs.SI
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从病毒式信息中学习

Learning from Viral Information

Boston University(波士顿大学);University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学)

Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He

AI总结:

本文构建了一个序贯博弈模型,研究理性代理人在社交媒体环境中如何通过观察他人信号(新闻故事)和采样(新闻推送)来学习并决定是否认可信号,重点分析采样规则偏向病毒式信号对信息聚合的影响。

摘要:

受社交媒体启发,我们研究了一个代理人相互交互并从彼此信号中学习的均衡模型。理性代理人依次到达,观察一个信号(对应一个新闻故事)和一组前人的信号样本(对应一个新闻推送),并决定认可哪些信号。观察到的样本由前人的认可行为和采样规则(捕捉平台算法)共同决定。我们关注采样规则选择更具病毒性(即被广泛认可)信号的频率。向代理人展示病毒性信号可以增加信息聚合,但也可能产生稳态,其中大多数被认可的信号是错误的。这些误导性的稳态会自我延续,因为观察到错误信号的代理人会形成错误信念,从而理性地继续认可它们。我们强调了我们的结果对社交媒体平台的几个启示。

英文摘要:

Motivated by social media, we study an equilibrium model of agents interacting with and learning from each other's signals. Rational agents arrive sequentially, observe a signal (corresponding to a news story) and a sample of predecessors' signals (corresponding to a news feed), and decide which of these signals to endorse. The observed sample is jointly determined by predecessors' endorsement behavior and a sampling rule (capturing a platform algorithm). We focus on how often the sampling rule selects more viral (i.e., widely endorsed) signals. Showing agents viral signals can increase information aggregation, but it can also generate steady states where most endorsed signals are wrong. These misleading steady states self-perpetuate, as agents who observe wrong signals develop wrong beliefs, and thus rationally continue to endorse them. We highlight several consequences of our results for social-media platforms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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