可持续区块链的演化动力学
Evolutionary Dynamics of Sustainable Blockchains
摘要：
区块链的能源可持续性，其共识协议依赖于工作量证明，引发了激烈的辩论。根本问题在于一个高度耗能的过程，即挖矿，需要验证加密资产交易。挖矿是解决加密难题的过程，通过获得奖励的可能性来激励。进行挖矿的用户（即矿工）数量越多，区块链的整体耗电量就越高。因此，采矿是一种负面的环境外部因素。在这里，我们研究矿工的利益是否能满足集体的需要，以遏制能源消耗。为此，我们引入了加密资产博弈，即基于进化博弈论框架的模型，该模型旨在研究人口的动态，其代理可以作为加密资产用户或矿工。挖矿的能源消耗会影响这两种策略的回报，这对矿工来说是一种直接成本，对加密资产用户来说是一个环境因素。通过数值模拟研究所提出的模型表明，在某些条件下，代理群体可以达到优化全局能耗的策略配置文件，即由低密度的矿工组成。最后，基于工作量证明的区块链能在能量上可持续吗？我们的研究结果表明，区块链协议参数可能在该技术的全球能源消耗中发挥相关作用。
英文摘要：
The energy sustainability of blockchains, whose consensus protocol rests on the Proof-of-Work, nourishes a heated debate. The underlying issue lies in a highly energy-consuming process, defined as mining, required to validate crypto-asset transactions. Mining is the process of solving a cryptographic puzzle, incentivised by the possibility of gaining a reward. The higher the number of users performing mining, i.e. miners, the higher the overall electricity consumption of a blockchain. For that reason, mining constitutes a negative environmental externality. Here, we study whether miners' interests can meet the collective need to curb energy consumption. To this end, we introduce the Crypto-Asset Game, namely a model based on the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory devised for studying the dynamics of a population whose agents can play as crypto-asset users or as miners. The energy consumption of mining impacts the payoff of both strategies, representing a direct cost for miners and an environmental factor for crypto-asset users. The proposed model, studied via numerical simulations, shows that, in some conditions, the agent population can reach a strategy profile that optimises global energy consumption, i.e. composed of a low density of miners. To conclude, can a Proof-of-Work-based blockchain become energetically sustainable? Our results suggest that blockchain protocol parameters could have a relevant role in the global energy consumption of this technology.
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